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I. INTRODUCTION 
The standard liability insurance policy1 provides both litigation and 
t B.A., 1980, Wilkes College; M.A., 1984, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1983, 
American University; Associate, Mudd, Harrison & Burch, Towson, Maryland. 
1. This article will concentrate on cases interpreting the duty-to-defend provision in a 
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liability protection for the insured. Each is an important benefit. The 
insurer's duty to defend relieves the insured of the expense of defending a 
suit and makes available the insurer's vast legal and investigative re-
sources for the purpose of defeating the claim. The insurer's duty to 
indemnify relieves the insured of the obligation to settle a claim or pay a 
final judgment. 
In Maryland, the duty to defend under the standard policy is deter-
mined by comparing the allegations in the claimant's pleadings to the 
coverage provisions of the policy.2 If the allegations describe an injury 
which is within the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify, then the 
insurer has a duty to defend. 3 Moreover, if the allegations do not fall 
within the policy's coverage but create a potential that the insurer will 
have a duty to indemnify, then the insurer must defend. This is true even 
if the insurer possesses independent knowledge that no duty to indemnify 
actually exists. It is only when the allegations fall clearly outside the 
scope of the coverage and do not raise a potentiality of coverage that the 
insurer has no duty to defend. 4 
In recent years, Maryland courts have expanded the insurer's de-
fense obligation to a point where the insurer has a near-absolute duty to 
defend whenever its insured is sued. This expansion is both appropriate 
and justified. As the drafter of the policy, the insurer could have limited 
Comprehensive General Liability (C.G.L.) policy, which will be referred to as the 
standard liability policy. Reference to other duty-to-defend provisions will be made 
to highlight the fundamental elements of the standard provision. The C.G.L. policy 
provides: 
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
A. bodily injury or 
B. property damage 
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the com-
pany shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured 
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, 
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, 
and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it 
deems expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any claim 
or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the com-
pany's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or 
settlements. 
For a discussion of the C.G.L. policy, see Sharpe & Shaffer, The Parameters of An 
Insurer's Duty to Defend, 19 FORUM 555 (1984). 
2. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 193-94, 438 A.2d 282, 
285-86 (1981). This is known as the comparison test. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 226 (Me. 1980). 
3. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-08, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975). 
4. See Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985) 
(citing Minnick's, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 47 Md. App. 329, 333-34, 422 A.2d 
1028, 1030 (1980)), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Mraz v. Canadian Universal 
Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986); GEICO v. Ropka, 74 Md. App. 249, 257, 
536 A.2d 1214, 1218 (1987) ("It is generally true that an insurer has no duty to 
defend a cause of action against an insured if that cause of action asserts liability on 
the part of the insured that comes within an exclusion in the insurance policy."), 
cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988). 
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its defense duty. Instead, the insurer bargained for the right to control 
the litigation and settlement process. In exchange, it promised to defend 
against groundless, false and fraudulent claims, and assumed the risk 
that its defense duty would arise because of ambiguous, incomplete or 
poorly drafted pleadings. 
This article analyzes the nature, extent and the existence of the in-
surer's duty to defend in Maryland under the standard liability policy. 
This article also attempts to clarify the concept of "potentiality of cover-
age" by an extended examination of the "exclusive pleading rule," "the 
potentiality rule" and "the comparison test."5 Special attention is given 
throughout to Maryland case law, although reference to the approaches 
taken by other jurisdictions are made for purposes of comparison. 6 In 
addition, the law of other jurisdictions is considered regarding issues not 
yet addressed by Maryland courts. 
II. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND 
There is no duty to defend on the part of an insurer at common 
law.7 The duty is contractual and is best understood in simple contract 
terms. 8 The insured pays a premium to the insurer. In return, he re-
ceives, as consideration, the insurer's promises to defend and to indem-
nify him. 9 The insurer's basic responsibility under a standard liability 
S. The main focus of this article is on issues that arise from the concept of "potentiality 
of coverage." The insurer's duty to use reasonable care and good faith in defending 
a claim is discussed only briefly, and its duties to investigate, to pay undisputed 
claims, to settle claims within policy limits, and to indemnify are addressed only as 
they relate to the duty to defend. Similarly, the coordination of other insurance 
clauses, the duties and responsibilities running between concurrent insurers, and the 
ethical problems faced by insurance defense counsel are only briefly mentioned. 
6. The insurer's duty to defend has spawned extensive commentary. See, e.g., Cahoon, 
Company's Duty to Defend-Recent Developments, 1961 INS. L.J. 151; Dohoney, 
The Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 451 (1981); Garbett, 
The Duty to Defend Clause in a Liability Insurance Policy: Should the Exclusive 
Pleading Test be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 235 (1982); Comment, The In-
surer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 
(1966) [hereinafter Comment, The Insurer's Duty]. 
7. See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Md. 1978); All-Star Ins. 
Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (cited with approval 
by Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 411-12, 347 A.2d 842, 852 
(1975)); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509, 
514-15, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984). 
8. Riviera Beach Volunteer Fire Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 388 F. Supp. 1114, 
1120 (D. Md. 1975) (duty to defend is a contractual assumption). One commenta-
tor, however, has observed that liability insurance has evolved from a simple con-
tractual agreement to a complex undertaking and that "most problems in liability 
insurance can no longer be viewed in a traditional contract analysis, but call for the 
application of tort doctrines, statutory construction and considerations of public 
policy." Comment, Liability Insurers and Third-Party Claimants: The Limits of 
Duty, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 125, 125 (1981). 
9. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396,409, 347 A.2d 842, 851 (1975). In 
addition to paying a premium, the insured promises to notify the insurer of any 
claims and to cooperate with the insurer's investigation and defense of any claim. 
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policy "is to defeat or pay a claim within the policy's coverage." 10 Thus, 
although the insurance is commonly known as liability insurance, it is in 
reality litigation insurance as well. 11 
The duty to defend, being a contractual obligation, exists only to the 
extent that the policy requires the insurer to defend its insured. The 
standard policy states that "the company shall have the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of ... 
bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the 
suit are groundless, false or fraudulent." 12 If a policy does not contain a 
duty-to-defend provision, then there is no implied duty to defend. 13 Sim-
ilarly, a policy that gives the insurer the right, but not the duty to defend, 
may not create a duty to defend. 14 
Although the standard policy contains a defense duty, some types of 
policies do not. Excess policies, 15 for example, often provide liability 
protection but no litigation protection. 16 Furthermore, some primary 
policies, 17 such as directors' and officers' liability policies, may contain a 
narrower duty to defend than is found in the standard policy. In such a 
case, Maryland courts will not infer a broader duty. In Continental Cas-
ualty Co. v. Board of Education, 18 for example, the court of appeals ob-
served that the provisions of the directors' and officers' liability policy 
under review were "substantially different from the duty to defend clause 
/d.; see also infra notes 167-174 and accompanying text. The insurer's duties of 
defense and indemnification involve obligations to investigate, negotiate and settle 
claims. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409, 347 A.2d at 851. 
10. Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 389-90, 267 A.2d 7, 10 (1970). 
11. See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409-10, 347 A.2d at 851. 
12. See supra note 1. 
13. See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 389~90 (D. Md. 1978). In Steyer, 
the court refused to recognize a duty to defend in a policy issued by the Home 
Insurance Company because of a provision expressly disclaiming the duty. /d. at 
394. The court, however, did not address whether an implied duty to defend could 
exist where the policy did not contain an express disclaimer. But see Conanicut 
Marine Servs., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 511 A.2d 967, 970 (R.I. 1986) 
(implied duty to defend found to exist because policy provided liability insurance 
and did not contain a provision negating duty to defend). 
14. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pacific. Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 144 (W.O. Pa. 
1984). 
15. Excess insurance, also known as secondary insurance, "attaches only after a prede-
termined amount of primary coverage has been exhausted." Olympic Ins. Co. v. 
Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App.3d 593, 597-98, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 
910-11 (1982) (quoted with approval in United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 52 Md. App. 269, 271-72, 447 A.2d 896, 898 (1982)). The Olympic 
court noted that "[i]t is not uncommon to have several layers of secondary insur-
ance." /d. at 597-98, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 911. 
16. See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); see also supra note 
13. 
17. Primary insurance is insurance which, under the terms of the policy, "attaches im-
mediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise to liability." 
Olympic, 126 Cal. App.3d at 597, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (emphasis in original). 
18. 302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985). 
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of a conventional liability policy." 19 The court held that the insurer's 
defense obligation extended only to claims that fell actually within cover-
age because (1) the policy did not give exclusive control of the litigation 
to the insurer, (2) it required the insured to retain its own counsel, and 
(3) it obligated the insurer to compensate the insured for those litigation 
expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the insured that were reasonably 
related to covered claims. 20 
As Continental suggests, the most notable feature of the insurer's 
duty to defend under the standard policy is its application to claims that 
fall outside the policy's coverage. The insurer's duties to defend and to 
indemnify are distinct and independent obligations, related only in that 
they both depend on the scope of coverage.21 The insurer's obligation to 
defend claims which are "groundless, false or fraudulent"22 under the 
standard policy exemplifies what has been called the "most significant 
19. /d. at 530, 489 A.2d at 543. The duty-to-defend provision provided that: 
(a) The Assureds and/or the School District shall select and retain legal 
counsel to represent them in the defense and appeal of any claim, suit, 
action or proceeding covered under this policy, but no fees, costs or ex-
penses shall be incurred or settlements made, without the Insurer's con-
sent, such consent not to be unreasonably witheld. 
(b) The Insurer may at its option and upon request, advance on behalf of 
an Assured, and/or the School District fees, costs and expenses which 
have been incurred in connection with claims made against an Assured, 
prior to disposition of such claims, provided always that, in the event it is 
finally established the Insurer has no liability hereunder, each agrees to 
repay to the Insurer, upon demand, all monies advanced on their 
behalf .... 
/d. at 522, 489 A.2d at 539. 
20. Continental argued that it did not have a duty to defend an entire multiple count 
complaint against its insured because the policy did not contain any duty-to-defend 
language, there was no obligation to defend groundless claims, and the insurer did 
not have the right to select counsel and control the litigation. /d. at 529, 489 A.2d 
at 542. 
21. See Steyer v Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Md. 1978). The duty to 
defend arises from a comparison of the claimant's allegations to the policy's cover-
age; the duty to indemnify arises from a comparison of the ultimate findings of fact 
in the underlying tort action to the policy's coverage. As the Steyer court noted, in 
contrast to the duty to defend, "the question whether the insurer has a duty to pay a 
final judgment against the insured turns on a comparison of the ultimate findings of 
fact concerning the alleged occurrence with the policy coverage." /d. at 389; see 
also Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Md. 
1977); Riviera Beach Volunteer Fire Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 388 F. Supp. 
1114, 1120 (D. Md. 1975). . 
22. In Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970), the court con-
strued the standard duty-to-defend provision as follows: 
The obligation to defend 'groundless, false or fraudulent' claims does not 
mean that the carrier will defend claims which would be beyond the cove-
nant to pay if the claimant prevailed. It means only that a carrier may not 
refuse to defend a suit on the ground that the claim asserted against the 
insured cannot possibly succeed because either in law or fact there is no 
basis for a plaintiff's judgment. 
/d. at 389, 267 A.2d at 10. In Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Co., 67 Md. App. 712, 509 A.2d 
711 (1986), the court ruled that language in a duty-to-defend provision requiring the 
insurer to defend the insured "even if the allegations are not true" was the 
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difference"23 between these two duties: the duty to defend is broader 
than the duty to indemnify.24 Under the standard policy, the insurer's 
duty to defend imposes an obligation to defend the insured not only 
against claims that actually fall within the policy's coverage but also 
against any claim alleging facts that raise a potential duty to indemnify.25 
III. THE INQUIRY INTO THE DUTY TO DEFEND 
The issue of whether an insurer has a duty to defend a particular 
claim made against its insured in Maryland has spawned extensive litiga-
tion and substantial confusion.26 Most of the difficulties emanate from 
the "exclusive pleading rule," the "potentiality rule" and the "compari-
son test." All three of these concepts flow directly from the language in 
the standard duty-to-defend provision.27 Language that varies from the 
standard provision, however, can invalidate any, or all, ofthese standard 
features. 28 A detailed analysis of the leading cases will highlight the in-
equivalent of the standard "groundless, false or fraudulent" language. /d. at 718, 
509 A.2d at 714. 
23. Sharpe & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 555-56. 
24. This hornbook rule of law has been stated explicitly by only one court applying 
Maryland law. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp. 
313, 321 (D. Md. 1984) ("the obligation to defend is broader than the obligation to 
pay a final judgment"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986). 
The rule, however, is implied in numerous decisions. 
25. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 320, 475 A.2d 509, 516, 
cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984). 
26. In general terms, the inquiry into the duty to defend involves four separate ques-
tions: (1) is there a duty?; (2) what is the duty?; (3) what is the scope of the duty?; 
and (4) does the claim give rise to the duty? The first three questions focus on the 
insurance policy, the fourth on the claim. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981), the court saw only two inquires that 
needed to be made when considering a duty-to-defend question. /d. at 197, 438 
A.2d at 287. The court found it unecessary to discuss either the existence of a duty-
to-defend provision or the type of defense duty because the St. Paul policy contained 
the standard duty-to-defend provision. The Pryseski comparison test, in essence, 
comprises steps three and four in the four-step inquiry. 
27. The standard policy provision invokes both the exclusive pleading rule and the com-
parison test by obligating the insurer "to defend any suit against the insured seeking 
damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage." See supra note 1. 
The qualifying clause that the duty applies "even if any of the allegations of the suit 
are groundless, false or fraudulent" buttresses this conclusion. See supra note 1; see 
also Dohoney, supra note 6, at 452. The "potentiality rule" arises from language 
that extends the insurer's obligation to defend against "groundless, false or fraudu-
lent" suits, but gives the insurer the power to "make such investigation, negotiation 
and settlement of any claims as it deems expedient." See supra note 1. 
28. In Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978), the court refused to 
recognize a duty to defend in a policy issued by the Home Insurance Company 
because of a provision expressly disclaiming the duty. The court noted that: 
One significant consequence of this ruling that there is no duty to d~fend is 
to make inapplicable the rule in a duty to defend situation that the liability 
of the insurer to defend is determined by comparison of the allegations in 
the complaint against the insured with the terms of the insurance policy. 
/d. at 394; see also Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 489 
A.2d 536 (1985) (exclusive pleading rule, potentiality rule and comparison test inva-
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tricacies and interplay of these rules. 
A. The Lee Cases and the Exclusive Pleading Rule 
Maryland, like the majority of states,29 follows the exclusive plead-
ing rule30 in determining whether an insurer has an obligation to defend 
its insured against a claimant's claim. The exclusive pleading rule holds 
that an insurer's defense obligation is determined solely by the allegations 
against the insured in the claimant's pleadings. Under this rule, informa-
tion extrinsic to the pleadings is not relevant in determining the insurer's 
defense obligation. 31 
The exclusive pleading rule has a long tradition. 32 Perhaps the case 
most often cited for the proposition that the insurer's defense obligation 
is to be determined solely by the allegations in the claimant's pleadings is 
the Second Circuit's decision in Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 33 
which has been quoted with approval by Maryland courts.34 In Lee, the 
claimant, a customer in a pet store, sued the store for personal injuries 
after he fell down an elevator shaft. Aetna, the store's insurer, discov-
ered through its investigation that the claimant had fallen while trying to 
use the elevator. Aetna refused to defend even though the policy con-
tained a standard duty-to-defend provision, because coverage for liability 
arising out of the use of an elevator was excluded. The complaint, how-
ever, alleged only that the claimant had fallen down the elevator shaft as 
a result of the insured's negligence; it did not explicitly state that the 
claimant was attempting to use the elevator when the accident 
occurred. 35 
Aetna argued that it had no duty to defend because the actual facts 
of the tort action unequivocally showed that the claimant's injuries were 
excluded from coverage. The insured argued that the insurer's duty to 
defend rested on the claimant's allegations and that the insurer was not 
allowed to look beyond the four comers of the complaint in order to 
lid because directors' and officers' liability policy does not contain a duty-to-defend 
provision similar to the standard policy). 
29. See Annotation, Allegations in Third Person's Action Against Insured as Determining 
Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 50 A.L.R.2o 458 (1956). 
30. The majority rule has been called several different names. Compare Garbett, supra 
note 6 ("exclusive pleading test") with Dohoney, supra note 6 ("complaint allega-
tion rule"). The exclusive pleading rule is used in this article because it appears to 
be the most accurate description, especially in light of Maryland Rules 1-202(r) and 
2-302, which define a pleading as a complaint, an answer, a counterclaim, a cross-
claim, or a third-party complaint. See Mo. R. 1-202(r), 2-302. The concept that an 
insurer's duty to defend may be determined only by the allegations in the claimant's 
pleadings is also more properly categorized as a rule than a test. 
31. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
32. See Cahoon, supra note 6, at 151. 
33. 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949). 
34. See, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 408, 347 A.2d 842, 850 
(1975). 
35. Lee, 178 F.2d at 753. 
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determine its defense obligation. 36 The Second Circuit agreed with the 
insured, holding that the insurer's promise to defend groundless, false or 
fraudulent suits meant: 
[T]hat the insurer will defend the suit, if the injured party states 
a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury 'covered' by the pol-
icy; it is the claim which determines the insurer's duty to de-
fend; and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information 
from the insured, or from anyone else, which indicates, or even 
demonstrates, that the injury is not in fact 'covered.'37 
The holding in Lee,38 according to one commentator, "firmly estab-
lished" the exclusive pleading rule in American insurance law.39 
Maryland has recognized the exclusive pleading rule. One court has 
even called it a black letter rule of Maryland insurance law,40 and excep-
tions to or deviations from the rule have been rejected repeatedly.41 In 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lee,42 for example, an employee of the 
insured, sued the manufacturers of an underground tank that had ex-
ploded and injured him. The manufacturers then filed third-party claims 
for indemnity and contribution against the insured and Lee, who was a 
director, stockholder and president of the insured. The third-party com-
plaints alleged that Lee had negligently installed the underground stor-
age tank, but they did not allege in what capacity Lee had acted when he 
installed the tanks. Under the policy, Lee was covered only if he acted as 
a director or stockholder.43 
Ohio Casualty denied coverage because its investigation revealed 
36. Id. at 751-52. 
37. Id. at 751. The converse of this statement is not necessarily true. If the pleadings 
do not allege coverage but the insurer has facts that show coverage, then the insurer 
is generally obligated to defend. See infra text accompanying notes 257-275. 
38. The complaint raised a· potentiality of coverage because there was a possibility that 
the claimant had not been using the elevator when he fell down the shaft. If the 
complaint had expressly alleged that the plaintiff was "using" the elevator when he 
fell, then the insurer would not have had a duty to defend the insured. The facts 
established at trial showed that the plaintiff was indeed "using" the elevator when 
he fell down the shaft, and consequently Aetna had no duty to indemnify even 
though it had a duty to defend. Lee, 178 F.2d at 751-52. 
39. Garbett, supra note 6, at 239. 
40. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430,434 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 
822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988). 
41. See, e.g., Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (court specifically rejected the position that "an insurer can also look to 
the actual facts surrounding an event to determine whether or not coverage exists, 
and consequently to discern whether the insured has the duty to defend"). 
42. 62 Md. App. 176, 488 A.2d 988, cert. denied, 303 Md. 471, 494 A.2d 939 (1985). 
43. Id. at 181, 488 A.2d at 990. For a discussion of the nature, scope and validity of 
"co-employee" exclusions in an insurance policy, see Larimore v. American Ins. 
Co., 69 Md. App. 631, 519 A.2d 743 (1987), rev'd, 314 Md. 617, 552 A.2d 889 
(1989). See also Riviera Beach Volunteer Fire Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 388 
F. Supp. 1114 (D. Md. 1975); Bevans v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 356 F.2d 577 (4th 
Cir. 1966). 
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that the only possible capacity in which Lee could have acted when he 
installed the tanks was as the insured's president. The court of special 
appeals held that Ohio Casualty had an obligation to defend Lee even 
when it appeared from extrinsic evidence that Lee was excluded from 
coverage.44 According to the court, Ohio Casualty's contractual obliga-
tion to defend rested exclusively on the claimant's pleadings, and extrin-
sic evidence could not be used to negate that duty.45 
Although neither of the Lee courts discussed the rationale behind 
the exclusive pleading rule, both suggest that the language of the stan-
dard duty-to-defend clause provides that the insurer must determine its 
duty on the basis of the allegations in the claimant's pleadings.46 The 
44. The court observed: 
In the case sub judice, Ohio Casualty's belief as to the capacity in which 
Lee acted will not relieve it of its duty to defend Lee. Nor can Ohio Casu-
alty gain solace from the fact that there does not appear to be any basis for 
a claim based on a capacity other than president. It undertook to defend 
its insured against suits alleging bodily injury and seeking damages even if 
the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. 
Ohio Casualty, 62 Md. App. at 189-90, 488 A.2d at 995 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). The claimants' pleadings raised a potential that Ohio Casualty would 
have a duty to indemnify Lee because the fact finder could have determined that Lee 
acted as a director or stockholder when he installed the tanks. See infra text accom-
panying notes 52-84. 
45. Ohio Casualty, 62 Md. App. at 187-90, 488 A.2d at 994-95. The court of special 
appeals noted that "evidence concerning Lee's duties would be admissible and uti-
lized by the trier of fact to determine the capacity in which he acted." Jd. at 188 
n.l6, 488 A.2d at 994 n.l6. The court then concluded that: 
[T]he trier of fact would have to determine if Lee were acting as a director, 
as a stockholder, or as an employee performing the non-delegable duty of 
his employer, or if he was acting solely in the capacity of president of Auto 
Clean, therefore, as an employee. If it were to find the former, Lee would 
be covered under the policy of insurance. Conversely, if it were to find the 
latter, Lee would not be covered. In short, there is a 'potentiality' of 
coverage. 
ld. at 187-89, 488 A.2d at 994. The court's statement that Lee would have been 
covered under the policy had he been acting as an. employee performing a non-
delegable duty is incorrect. The co-employee exclusion applies to all employees act. 
ing within the scope of their employment. Including an employee who is ,perform-
ing a non-delegable duty defeats the very purpose of the co-employee exclusion. It 
is obvious that the Ohio Casualty court confuses the difference between insurance 
coverage and tort liability. Lee, as either a mere employee or an employee perform-
ing a non-delegable duty, is excluded from coverage. As an employee performing a 
non-delegable duty, however, Lee would enjoy tort immunity under the Maryland 
Workers' Compensation Act. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 101, §58 (1985); see also Athas 
v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 476 A.2d 710 (1984). The potentiality for indemnification in 
Ohio Casualty arose because the complaint was silent as to whether Lee was func-
tioning in his capacity as an employee (i.e., as president) or as a director or stock-
holder when he installed the tanks. It did not arise because the complaint was silent 
as to whether Lee was functioning as a mere employee or as an employee perform-
ing a non-delegable duty. 
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, 
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ind. 1971) ("If the parties had so intended, the 
insurance policy could have been drafted so as to predicate the duty of the insurer to 
defend upon a determination that the facts of the case actually were within the 
10 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
rule is also justified on several other grounds. Above all else, it is easy, 
efficient and objective.47 Abrogation of the exclusive pleading rule, as 
one commentator has phrased it, "would require the parties to the insur-
ance contract to exercise clairvoyance in order to determine their respec-
tive rights and liabilities, since there would be no objective ... basis-
such as reference to the [claimant's] pleadings-for determining these 
rights. "48 
In Maryland, the duty to defend can arise out of any type of original 
or amended pleading.49 While it is obvious that an original or amended 
complaint, counter-claim, cross-claim or third-party claim can give rise 
to a duty to defend, it is less obvious, but still technically possible, that an 
opposing party's original or amended answer can also give rise to the 
duty if the answer actually constitues a counterclaim. 50 When an origi-
nal pleading does not raise a duty to defend but a subsequent pleading 
does, the insurer's defense duty does not arise unless, and until, the in-
surer is notified of the subsequent pleading and asked to assume the 
defense. 5 1 
B. Brohawn and the Potentiality Rule 
·Perhaps the most important and most misunderstood aspect of an 
insurer's duty to defend its insured is the concept of "potentiality of cov-
erage." The court of special appeals has recognized the confusion that 
surrounds the concept of "potentiality of coverage" by noting that it is 
only a "somewhat distinct standard."52 The duty to defend all claims 
coverage of the policy. Since the policy makes the duty to defend rest upon the 
allegations of the injured party, the Court has no authority to look beyond the alle-
gations to the actual facts."); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888, 893 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981)("We pose the question: Why is the duty of the insurer to 
defend determinative of the allegations in the third party's complaint? We answer 
our own question with the very logical conclusion that the contract so provides .... 
That is the coverage paid for by the insured."). 
47. Dohoney states that the exclusive pleading rule "is clearly a mechanical one and, 
therefore, should present little difficulty for courts attempting to determine the lia-
bility insurer's obligation to defend under most ... policies." Dohoney, supra note 
6, at 453. Garbett, while questioning the validity of the rule in some contexts, ad-
mits that it affords "efficiency, ease of application, and objectivity." Garbett, supra 
note 6, at 261. 
48. Dohoney, supra note 6, at 455. 
49. Maryland Rules 1-202(r) and 2-302(a) define a pleading as a complaint, an answer, a 
counterclaim, a cross-claim or a third-party complaint. MD. R. 1-202(r), 2-302(a). 
Under Maryland Rule 2-341 amendments of pleadings are freely allowed. MD. R. 
2-341. 
50. Maryland Rule 2-323(g) provides that "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated 
... a counterclaim as a defense, the court shall treat the pleading as if there had 
been a proper designation, if justice so requires." MD. R. 2-323(g). 
51. See Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch. Co., 67 Md. App. 712,718-19,509 A.2d 711,714-15 
(1986); see also Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 482 
A.2d 503 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 289, 487 A.2d 292 (1985). 
52. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 69 Md. App. 664,671, 519 A.2d 
760, 764 (1987). This confusion possibly arises because the term "coverage" has 
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which potentially come within policy coverage was fully articulated in 
Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Company. 53 There, the coverage is-
sue arose out of an altercation at a nursing home when Mary Brohawn 
tried to remove her grandmother from the home. 54 Several employees of 
the home questioned the appropriateness of the removal and attempted 
to prevent it. An argument ensued, and Brohawn allegedly assaulted two 
of the employees. 55 Brohawn was arrested and charged with kidnapping 
and assault. She pleaded guilty to the assault charge and the kidnapping 
charge was dismissed. Several months later, the two employees filed a 
civil suit against Brohawn for assault.56 Subsequently, the suit was 
amended by addition of a count which alleged that the employees' inju-
ries were caused by Brohawn's negligence. 
At the time of the incident at the nursing home, Brohawn was in-
sured by Transamerica Insurance Company under a homeowner's policy 
that contained a variation of the standard duty-to-defend provision. 57 
several different meanings. In All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 
160 (N.D. Ind. 1971), the court stated: 
Whether an insurance policy 'covers' a particular incident depends ini-
tially upon whether the contract is in force (e.g., whether premiums have 
been paid), whether the conditions precedent have been met (e.g., whether 
the insured notified the insurer of the accident), and whether the incident 
falls within a specific exclusion in the policy (e.g., where the driver of an 
automobile was not legally authorized to drive a car). If there is no 'cover-
age' in the sense used here, the Court never reaches the problems of deter-
mining the duty to defend or duty to pay under the contract since the 
contract does not even apply in such a situation .... 
If it is determined that the contract does apply, the Court must then 
look to 'coverage' in a different sense to determine the duties of the insurer 
under the policy. There are two types of 'coverage' which are involved 
here. There is the question of whether the risk insured against encom-
passes the facts of the accident as alleged. There is also the question of 
whether in fact the occurrence was of the type insured against. In this 
latter sense, 'coverage' is synonymous with liability to pay. 
ld. at 162 (emphasis in original). 
53. 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 850-51 (1975). The potentiality rule was first 
articulated in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting 
Co., 228 Md. 40, 54, 178 A.2d 872, 879 (1962). 
54. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Brohawn, 23 Md. App. 186, 187-91, 326 A.2d 758, 
760-62 (1974), rev'd, 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975). 
55. ld. at 188-89, 326 A.2d at 760-61. The facts of the case suggest that the court used 
the term "assault" to refer to both an assault and a battery. The term is used in this 
context in this article. 
56. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages and alleged that 
"Brohawn ... did 'with force and arms, willfully and maliciously and without any 
just cause or provocation' assault them, resulting in 'serious, painful and permanent 
injuries.'" Brohawn, 276 Md. at 399, 347 A.2d at 846 (quoting complaint). 
57. The duty-to-defend provision was contained in the "Comprehensive Personal Lia-
bility" section of the policy, under which the insurer agreed: 
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property 
damage, and the Company shall defend any suit against the Insured alleg-
ing such bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages which are 
payable under the terms of this Section, even if any of the allegations of the 
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The policy excluded coverage for "any act committed by or at the direc-
tion of the Insured with intent to cause injury to person or property."58 
Transamerica refused to defend Brohawn and requested a declaratory 
judgment that it had no obligation either to defend or to indemnify 
Brohawn in the underlying tort action. 
The trial court denied Transamerica's request for a declaratory 
judgment, held that the indemnity issue would be decided by the jury's 
verdict on the issues in the underlying tort suit and ordered Transamer-
ica to defend Brohawn. 59 Transamerica appealed, arguing that it had no 
duty to defend Brohawn because her guilty plea in the criminal trial had 
established that any injuries received by the plaintiffs in the tort suit were 
the result of intentional acts by Brohawn.60 In addition, Transamerica 
argued that even if it had an obligation to defend Brohawn, it should be 
relieved of that duty because of conflict of interest and possible 
prejudice. 61 
The court of appeals first addressed the obligations imposed by the 
standard duty-to-defend provision: 
The obligation of an insurer to defend its insured under a con-
tract provision such as here involved is determined by the alle-
gations in the tort actions. If the plaintiffs in the tort suits 
allege a claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to 
defend. . . . Even if a tort plaintiff does not allege facts which 
suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but the Company may make such 
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. 
/d. at 400, 347 A.2d at 846 (emphasis in original). Note the difference between the 
duty-to-defend language in the Brohawn policy (any suit against the insured alleging 
such bodily injury) and the language in the C.G.L. policy (any suit against the in-
sured seeking damages). See supra note 1. Dohoney argues that the difference does 
not affect the validity of the exclusive pleading rule. Dohoney, supra note 6, at 454-
55. 
58. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 400, 347 A.2d at 846. 
59. /d. at 401-02, 347 A.2d at 846-47. The Brohawn court's holding that the issue of 
whether Brohawn acted negligently or intentionally would be decided in the under-
lying tort action implicitly recognizes the use of special jury questions. See Mo. R. 
2-522(c). For an example of special jury questions in a tort action involving alterna-
tive theories of negligence and intentional torts, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 
Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310 Md. 274, 528 A.2d 1286 (1987). 
Insurance defense counsel, however, should be cautious about using special jury 
questions in a conflict-of-interest situation. If the insured has consented to the in-
surer's selection of independent counsel, then the independent counsel's use of spe-
cial jury questions may violate the duties of loyalty he owes to the insured. See 
generally Williams & Jernberg, Conflicts of Interest in Insurance Defense Litigation: 
Common Sense in Changing Times, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 111 (1981). If the 
defense counsel thinks that the special jury questions are in the best interests of the 
insured, he should fully explain the nature, purpose and consequences-both in tort 
liability and insurance coverage contexts--of the questions to the insured. He 
should then obtain the insured's express written permission to use the questions and 
notify the insurer of his inteption to use them. 
60. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 403, 347 A.2d at 847. 
61. Id. at 410-15, 347 A.2d at 852-54. For a discussion of the conflict of interest be-
tween the insurer and the insured, see infra text accompanying notes 175-205. 
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clearly bring the claim within or without the policy coverage, 
the insurer still must defend if there is a potentiality that· the 
claim could be covered by the policy. 62 
13 
According to the court, the insurer's obligation was to defend any suit 
stating a claim within the policy even when "'the claim asserted against 
the insured cannot possibly succeed because either in law or fact there is 
no basis for a plaintiff's judgment.' " 63 Even though Brohawn had 
pleaded guilty to the criminal assault charge, that plea was not binding in 
the civil action, and the fact finder in the civil action could have decided 
that Brohawn acted negligently, not intentionally. Thus, a potentiality of 
coverage existed. 
The court also specifically rejected Transamerica's argument that 
performance of its obligation to defend was made more difficult because 
of the evidence that Brohawn's acts were intentional.64 Similarly, the 
court found that the insurer was not relieved of its defense obligation 
because of the conflict of interest between it and the insured.65 Noting 
that unexpected difficulty does not discharge a promisor from his duty to 
perform, the court concluded that "(t]he insurer has unconditionally 
promised to defend the insured and therefore has assumed the risk that 
performance might be more difficult under some circumstances than 
others."66 In the court's view, the insurer's promise to defend its insured 
"unconditionally" was made in exchange for the absolute right to control 
the defense. Requiring the insurer to defend comported with the expec-
tations of the insured that the insurer would "employ its vast legal and 
investigative resources to defeat the action for the mutual benefit of both 
the insurer and the insured. " 67 
Brohawn and its progeny make clear that any potentiality of cover-
62. Brohawn, 216 Md. at 407-08, 347 A.2d at 850 (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted). 
63. /d. at 408-09, 347 A.2d at 850 (quoting Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 
267 A.2d 7 (1970)). 
64. Transamerica also sought to stay the underlying tort action until the declaratory 
judgment action had been resolved. The court of appeals rejected Transamerica's 
position, holding that the trial court had correctly denied Transamerica's request 
for declaratory relief on the grounds that the "ultimate issue" of whether Brohawn 
had acted negligently or intentionally would be fully decided in another pending 
action. /d. at 405, 347 A.2d at 849; see also infra notes 100-103 and accompanying 
text. 
65. Brohawn, 216 Md. at 414-15, 347 A.2d at 854. The court held that when such a 
conflict arises, the insurer must give the insured a choice of accepting the insurer's 
independent counsel or retaining his own counsel. If the insured retains his own 
attorney, then the insurer is obligated to reimburse the insured for reasonable litiga-
tion expenses and attorney's fees. /d.; see also infra text accompanying notes 175-
205. 
66. Brohawn, 216 Md. at 410, 347 A.2d at 851. 
67. /d. While Maryland courts have not embraced the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions, they have considered the insured's expectations in determining the intent of 
the parties to an insurance contract. See infra notes 264-267 and accompanying 
text. For a general discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see 1A R. 
LONG & M. RHODES, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE§ 5.09 (1987). 
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age, no matter how slight, gives rise to a duty to defend. The potentiality 
rule, in this regard, is perhaps better labeled the "possibility rule,"68 and 
courts have characterized it as such. 69 The defense obligation extends 
even to those claims filed in bad faith for the sole purpose of raising a 
potentiality of coverage. For example, a claimant may add a negligence 
count to a pleading in order to create a Brohawn potentiality for the pur-
pose of bringing the insurer into the case, even if there is little, if any, 
basis for the negligence count. Similarly, an insured's attorney may ask 
the claimant's attorney to amend a pleading to include a negligence 
count.70 While some courts have relieved an insurer of its duty to de-
fend bad-faith potentiality claims, the better reasoned rule is that the in-
surer remains obligated to defend.71 The promise to defend groundless, 
false or fraudulent claims is clearly broad enough to include defending 
the insured against allegations made for the sole purpose of invoking the 
insurer's duty to defend. 72 
68. In Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952), the court 
characterized the rule in the following manner: 
[I]n our opinion the policy should be so construed as to require the insurer 
to defend where it is apparent from the pleading that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the insured may be able, under the allegations of the com-
plaint, to prove that his injuries were caused by some act or omission cov-
ered by the terms of the contract. 
/d. at 56 (emphasis added). 
69. See, e.g., Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (applying Maryland law) (complaint left open "the possibility that [the 
insured] acted negligently rather than intentionally" (emphasis added)). 
70. See Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for Testing 
the Insurer's Duty to Defend: A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 18, 27 (1975); see 
also Oweiss v. Erie Insurance Exchange Co., 67 Md. App. 712, 509 A.2d 711 (1986). 
In Oweiss, the insurer argued that the claimant and the insured had contrived to 
include a negligence count in an amended complaint, and that as a consequence the 
company was relieved of its duty to defend. The court rejected the insurer's position 
for lack of evidence, but the decision implicitly left open the possibility that, in a 
proper case, either collusion between an insured and the claimant or the claimant's 
bad-faith inclusion of a count raising a potentiality of coverage would relieve an 
insurer of its duty to defend. 
71. See A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSUR-
ANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 4.04, at 139-40 {2d ed. 1988). But see State 
Farm Ins. Co. v. Trezza, 121 Misc. 2d 997, 1001, 469 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1983) (if insurer believes a complaint "has been drafted in bad faith and 
designed solely to bring an insurer into a case," it can institute a declaratory judg-
ment action against the claimant "to test the factual allegations of the complaint in 
the underlying [tort] action"). 
72. In such a situation the insurer would have recourse against the claimant and his 
attorney under Maryland Rule 1-341, which provides: 
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in 
maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without sub-
stantial justification the court may require the offending party or the attor-
ney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the 
costs of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it. 
Mo. R. 1-341. Moreover, if the insurer has offered a defense to the insured but the 
insured has colluded with the claimant to create a potentiality issue where the facts 
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There are several ways for claims to fall potentially within the cov-
erage of a policy. In a Brohawn-type complaint, there is one count for 
negligence and one count for an intentional tort. The former is within 
coverage; the latter is not. The insurer is obligated to defend because the 
fact finder could decide that the insured's actions were negligent, not in-
tentional, thus keeping the claim within coverage. The Brohawn potenti-
ality rule, however, is applicable not only to a multiple-count pleading 
that alleges negligence and an intentional tort as alternative theories of 
recovery, but also to any pleading containing allegations that, if proved, 
will establish liability within the policy's coverage. 73 
A potentiality of coverage can also arise because of ambiguous alle-
gations. In Southern Maryland Agricultural Association v. Bituminous 
Casualty Corp., 74 for example, the allegations in the complaint did not 
state with precision whether a malicious prosecution had occurred dur-
ing the applicable policy dates. The court held that the incomplete alle-
gations in the complaint raised a potentiality of coverage and required 
the insurer to defend. 75 Similarly, in Harford Mutual Insurance v. Jacob-
son,76 a potentiality of coverage arose because of vague allegations.77 
Harford had attempted to withdraw its defense because its investigation 
showed that the lead poisoning injuries alleged in the complaint fell 
outside of the applicable dates of the policy period. 78 In holding that 
do not justify it, the insurer may be able to assert a breach of the insured's duty to 
cooperate. See Newman v. Stocker, 161 Md. 552, 157 A. 761 (1932); Anderson & 
Ireland Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 123 Md. 67, 90 A. 780 (1914) (discussion of 
insured's collusion with claimant as possible breach of insured's duty to cooperate 
with the insurer). 
73. See, e.g., Minnick's, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 47 Md. App. 329, 333-34, 422 A.2d 
1028, 1030 (1980) (claim for loss of consortium in multiple-count complaint gives 
rise to a potentiality of coverage); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981) (potentiality of coverage was raised 
where question whether insurer had duty to indemnify was for the factfinder). For 
an extended discussion of Pryseski, see infra text accompanying notes 85-118. 
74. 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982). 
75. /d. at 1304. The court concluded that "[t]he question whether the 'offense' was 
actually committed during the policy period, so as to indicate coverage under the 
first Pryseski inquiry, is so 'intertwined' with the second inquiry that it must be 
resolved in the underlying suit." /d. (emphasis in original). 
76. 73 Md. App. 670, 536 A.2d 120, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988). 
77. Keisha Carter and her mother sued Jacobson, who was acting as the personal repre-
sentative of the estate of Israel Shapiro, for personal injuries Keisha received from 
eating lead paint chips in a rental house owned by Shapiro's estate. The complaint 
alleged "that at or about 1981 Keisha Carter consumed lead paint chips and subse-
quently became ill." /d. at 675, 536 A.2d at 122. The complaint also alleged that 
Keisha Carter "has required extensive and continuous medical care, attention and 
treatment ... [and] ... is still receiving treatment." /d. at 675, 536 A.2d at 122-23. 
At the time the Carter complaint was filed in November 1983, Shapiro's estate was 
insured by Harford Mutual against claims arising out of the ownership of the rental 
house. The Harford policy took effect on June 3, 1983. Harford's investigation of 
the claim discovered that Keisha Carter was afflicted with lead poisoning as early as 
September 8, 1982. /d. at 674, 536 A.2d at 122. 
78. "Bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sus-
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Harford had a duty to defend its insured, the court of special appeals first 
noted that "while Harford may believe that the incidents giving rise to 
liability preceded the date the policy became effective ... this belief will 
not relieve it of its duty to defend its insured."79 The court then decided 
that the vagueness of such phrases in the complaint as "at or about," 
"subsequently became ill," "has required ... continuous medical care, 
attention and treatment" and "is still receiving treatment," coupled with 
allegations that notice of a lead paint housing code violation had been 
issued during the policy period, created a potentiality that the occurrence 
happened within the policy period and gave rise to a duty to defend. 80 
A clear and unmistakable implication of Brohawn and its progeny is 
that the duty to defend exists unless it can be conclusively shown as a 
matter of law that there is no possible factual or legal basis on which the 
insurer may eventually be found liable under its duty to indemnify.81 In 
analyzing a pleading, then, three maxims should guide the inquiry into 
whether the allegations create a potentiality that the insurer will have a 
duty to indemnify. First, if there is a reasonable possibility that the alle-
gations raise a claim within the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify, 
the insurer must defend. Second, the insured's right to a defense should 
be foreclosed only if the pleadings indicate that "such a result is inescap-
ably necessary."82 Finally, if there is any doubt as to "whether or not the 
allegations ... against the insured state a cause of action within the cov-
erage of a liability policy sufficient to compel the insurer to defend the 
action, such doubt will be resolved in [the] insured's favor." 83 The gen-
tained by any person which occurs during the policy period." /d. at 680, 536 A.2d at 
125 (emphasis in original). 
79. /d. at 678, 536 A.2d at 124. 
80. /d. at 675-79, 536 A.2d at 122-24 (emphasis added). The court, however, found that 
Harford had no duty to indemnify Jacobson because evidence adduced during the 
declaratory judgment action showed that although Keisha Carter's injuries had per-
sisted into the period of coverage under the Harford policy, "her injuries first mani-
fested themselves prior to coverage when she was diagnosed in 1982 by the 
Baltimore City Health Department as having lead poisoning." /d. at 684, 536 A.2d 
at 127. In the court's view, the date of an "occurrence" for the purposes of deter-
mining coverage under the standard liability policy was the date when the harm was 
first discovered. /d. at 684, 536 A.2d at 127. Thus, Carter's claim "occurred" 
before the policy became effective and, accordingly, was beyond the risk undertaken 
by the insurer. 
81. Pennsylvania Aluminum, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 61 A.D.2d 1119, 402 
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1978) (New York rule). 
82. See Donnelly v. Transportation Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[W]ith 
the great latitude with which pleadings are construed today, and the great latitude 
of amendment, an insured's right to a defense should not be foreclosed unless such a 
result is inescapably necessary."). 
83. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 Md. 
40, 54, 178 A.2d 872, 879 (1962) (quoting Annotation, Allegations in Third Person's 
Action Against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 50 
A.L.R.2o 458 (1956)) (emphasis added by the court). This is, essentially, the appli-
cation of the doctrine of contra proferentem to the comparison test. See Babcock & 
Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1970) (The comparison 
test developed when pleading was required to be more specific; under notice plead-
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eral, overriding rule for an insurer to follow is, as one commentator has 
phrased it, "when in doubt, defend."84 
C Pryseski and the Comparison Test 
Although the Brohawn court established that an insurer has a duty 
to defend a claim that comes potentially within the policy's coverage, it 
did not set out any express guidelines for determining when a potentiality 
of coverage actually exists. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Pryseski, 85 the Court of Appeals of Maryland again had the opportunity 
to consider the potentiality issue, and this time it delineated a practical 
approach to the problem. 
The insurance coverage dispute in Pryseski arose out of a personal 
injury suit brought by Mr. and Mrs. Grantland against Charles Pryseski 
and Sun Life Insurance Company of America. The plaintiffs alleged that 
Pryseski had made sexual advances toward Mrs. Grantland while he was 
at her home collecting a monthly insurance premium for his employer, 
Sun Life. 86 St. Paul insured Sun Life under a comprehensive liability 
policy that provided personal injury coverage87 and contained the stan-
dard duty-to-defend provision. An endorsement to the policy extended 
coverage to employees acting within the scope of their duties. The in-
demnity provision provided coverage for damages because of bodily in-
jury caused by an occurrence. The term "occurrence" was not defined in 
the policy itself, only in the policy jacket. 88 
St. Paul entered a defense for Sun Life but refused to defend 
Pryseski. 89 St. Paul eventually settled the Grantland tort ac-
ing, "[t]he courts have generally placed the burden of uncertainty as to the policy's 
coverage on the insurer."). 
84. 1A R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.01; see also infra notes 232-256 and 
accompanying text. 
85. 292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981). 
86. The complaint contained three counts. The first, for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, alleged that Pryseski, during the course of and while acting in the 
scope of his employment with Sun Life, made sexual advances toward Mrs. Grant-
land. The second count, for assault and battery, asserted that Pryseski, during the 
course of and while in the scope of his employment with Sun Life, assaulted and 
battered Mrs. Grantland. The third count was a joint claim by Mr. and Mrs. 
Grantland for loss of consortium. Pryseski's duties at Sun Life included the collect-
ing of insurance premiums. /d. at 190-91, 438 A.2d at 284. 
87. Personal injury liability insurance provides coverage for such offenses as false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, defamation, and wrongful entry or eviction. 
88. Pryseski, 292 Md. at 189, 438 A.2d at 283. In its appellant's brief, however, St. Paul 
indicated that the term "occurrence" was defined in a policy jacket that for some 
reason had not been attached to Pryseski's petition for a declaratory judgment, nor 
had it been produced by St. Paul with the rest of the policy during discovery or 
introduced by either Pryseski or St. Paul into evidence at trial. Because the jacket 
was not part of the record in the case, the court of appeals remanded and instructed 
that the definition of "occurrence" in the jacket could be considered by the trial 
court. /d. at 199-200, 438 A.2d at 288-89. 
89. St. Paul refused to defend Pryseski on two grounds: (1) Pryseski was not acting 
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tion, 90 but Pryseski filed suit for a declaratory judgment that St. Paul had 
a duty to defend him because of a "potentiality" of coverage, and sought 
recovery of the legal expenses he incurred as a result of St. Paul's breach 
of its duty. 91 The trial court ruled that St. Paul had a duty to defend 
Pryseski. St. Paul appealed, and the court of special appeals affirmed on 
the basis of Brohawn.92 The court of appeals granted certiorari.93 
In considering the coverage issue, the court of appeals established a 
comparison test: 
In determining whether a liability insurer has a duty to provide 
its insured with a defense in a tort suit, two types of questions 
ordinarily must be answered: (1) what is the coverage and what 
are the defenses under the terms and requirements of the insur-
ance policy? (2) do the allegations in the tort action potentially 
bring the tort claim within the policy's coverage? The first 
question focuses upon the language and requirements of the 
policy, and the second question focuses upon the allegations of 
the tort suit. At times these two questions involve separate and 
distinct matters, and at other times they are intertwined, per-
haps involving an identical issue.94 
The court then qualified its comparison test by placing the Brohawn 
potentiality rule within the framework of the test: 
The 'rule' ... that the insurer has a duty to defend if the allega-
tions of the tort suit raise a 'potentiality' that coverage exists, is 
generally applicable only to the second question set forth above. 
It may, however, be applicable to an issue raised under the first 
question set forth above if that issue must also be resolved in 
the underlying tort suit.9s 
After establishing the comparison test, the court of appeals at-
tempted to apply it to the facts of the dispute between Pryseski and St. 
Paul. Under the first inquiry, the court found that the policy obligated 
St. Paul to indemnify Sun Life for all sums that Sun Life was legally 
bound to pay as damages caused by an "occurrence" committed by an 
employee acting within the scope of his employment. Owing to proce-
dural oversight, however, the trial court had not considered the defini-
tion of occurrence given in the policy jacket. 96 Therefore, the case was 
remanded for further consideration and the court never reached the sec-
within the scope of his employment; and (2) the policy excluded coverage for "will-
ful acts in violation of [a] penal statute or ordinance." /d. at 191, 438 A.2d at 284. 
90. St. Paul obtained a release from the Grantlands for both Pryseski and Sun Life. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. The court of special appeals' opinion was unreported. See St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 47 Md. App. 753 (decided Oct. 27, 1980). 
93. 289 Md. 741 (cert. granted Feb. 10, 1981). 
94. Pryseski, 292 Md. at 193-94, 438 A.2d at 285. 
95. /d. 
96. See supra note 88. 
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ond prong of the test. 97 
Although the court of appeals in Pryseski never completed its appli-
cation of the comparison test, it noted that the complaint raised a poten-
tiality of coverage when it alleged that Pryseski was acting within the 
scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted Mrs. Grantland.98 
This conclusion, however, would not have ended the inquiry. St. Paul 
would have had a duty to defend only if the Grantlands' claims were of 
the type that fell within the definition of occurrence. If the allegations 
against Pryseski did not actually or potentially amount to an occurrence 
as defined in the insurance policy, St. Paul would not have been obligated 
to defend Pryseski. 99 
The Pryseski comparison test seeks to establish a reliable and 
mechanical method for determining both actual and potential coverage. 
It also seeks to differentiate between coverage issues that are "separate 
and distinct" from the issues in the tort suit and those that are "inter-
twined" with the issues in the tort suit. Intertwined coverage questions 
are those that cannot be tried in a separate declaratory action if the un-
derlying tort action is pending because they involve an ultimate issue at 
trial. 100 A factual issue is intertwined with the underlying tort action if it 
is "squarely presented for resolution in the tort action ... ," 101 is material 
to establishing the tort liability of the insured, and would establish the 
insurer's liability under its duty to indemnify. 102 A factual issue is not 
material if it is collateral to the issues in the underlying tort action but 
would nevertheless bear upon the insurer's liability under its duty to 
indemnify. 103 
97. Pryseski, 292 Md. at 199-200 & n.l, 438 A.2d at 288-89 & n.l. 
98. Id. at 196, 438 A.2d at 287 ("In light of the allegations of the tort suit concerning 
scope of employment and ratification, the court of special appeals in this case cor-
rectly held that the tort suit determined the scope of employment issue."). 
99. See Edward Winkler & Son, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 51 Md. App. 190, 441 
A.2d 1129 (1982). 
100. Whether Brohawn acted intentionally or negligently, or whether Pryseski was act-
ing within the scope of his employment, are prime examples of this type of coverage 
question. 
101. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 810, 506 A.2d 641, 643 
(1986); see also Pope v. Sun Cab Co., 62 Md. App. 218, 225, 488 A.2d 1009, 1012 
(1984) (the Brohawn court's concept of "ultimate issues" includes "those issues 
raised by a [party] which, if resolved in his favor, will provide him with an absolute 
defense to the pending suit"), aff'd sub nom. Maryland Auto Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab 
Co., 305 Md. 807, 506 A.2d 641 (1986). 
102. Compare Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509, 
514-15 (issue must be material to tort action), cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 
502 (1984) with Travelers lndem. Co. v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 
671, 519 A.2d 760, 763 (1987) (issue must be central to tort action). 
103. For example, the question whether a driver of an automobile is using it with the 
permission of the owner is collateral to the dirver's tort liability but would have had 
a bearing on the insurer's duty to indemnify. In most cases, a factual question that 
is collateral to the issues in the underlying tort action does not create a conflict of 
interest over the conduct of the defense, and the insurer would not have to offer the 
insured his Brohawn choice of counsel. See infra notes 181-182 and accompanying 
text. There is even authority that an insurer can move beyond the four comers of 
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Unfortunately, the Pryseski court's statement that the first and sec-
ond prongs of the test may be intertwined or even involve the identical 
issue has created abundant confusion. The court's qualification that the 
potentiality rule is generally applicable only to the second part of the 
comparison test, but may, under some circumstances, be applicable to 
the first part, has only compounded the problem. 
The Pryseski comparison test is little more than a recognition that 
before a court can address whether there is a "potentiality of coverage," 
it must first ascertain the scope of "coverage" under the policy's lan-
guage.104 Under the first step, the court tries to determine "what sorts of 
claims are covered under the policy"105 by applying the principles of con-
struction 106 to the policy's coverage grants, definitions and exclusions. If 
the policy is unambiguous, the court determines its scope as a matter of 
law. 107 If the policy is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evi-
dence in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity. 108 If the extrinsic evidence 
is inconclusive, the policy is construed against the insurer. 109 
the claimant's pleadings to consider the actual, rather than the alleged, facts in de-
termining whether it has a duty to defend. See Rairigh, 59 App. at 320..21, 475 A.2d 
at 516-17; see also notes 257-275 and accompanying text. 
104. The first step is to consider the definitions of the key terms in the coverage grant in 
order to ascertain the breadth of the insurer's duty to indemnify. The key terms in 
the standard duty-to-defend provision are "damages," "property damage," "bodily 
injury," "caused by" and "occurrence." See Sharpe & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 557-
61. Usually, each of these terms is defined in the policy, and Maryland courts have 
considered many of the standard definitions. The exclusions are then considered to 
determine how the policy narrows the scope of its coverage. Both coverage grants 
and coverage exclusions are interpreted in the same manner. Maryland, unlike 
other jurisdictions, does not read exclusions more narrowly than coverage grants. 
See Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217,227, 533 
A.2d 682, 687 ( 1987). Exclusions are independent of each other and are read sepa-
rately against the coverage grant. See Century I Joint Venture v. United States Fi-
delity & Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 559, 493 A.2d 370, 377-78, cert. denied, 304 
Md. 297, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985). 
105. Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. 
Md. 1982). 
106. Construction of an insurance policy is governed by "a few well-established princi-
ples." Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 
A.2d 486, 488 (1985). One principle is to apply the contract's terms unless they 
violate a statute, a regulation, or public policy. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. 
Co. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 250, 508 A.2d 130, 133 (1986). A second principle is 
to construe the instrument as a whole to determine the intention of the parties to the 
insurance contract. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488; see also 
Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Md. 371, 375, 378 A.2d 1346, 1348 
(1977); Federal Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 Md. 460, 473, 341 A.2d 399, 407 
(1975). Finally, "the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and cir-
cumstances of the parties at the time of execution" should be examined. Pacific 
Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 
246 Md. 492, 496, 229 A.2d 70, 72 (1967). 
107. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 389, 488 A.2d at 489; Aragona, 281 Md. at 375, 378 
A.2d at 1348. 
108. See Pryseski, 292 Md. at 194, 438 A.2d at 288; Pacific /ndem., 302 Md. at 389, 488 
A.2d at 489. 
109. See Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295, 
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Once the scope of the coverage is determined, the court moves to the 
second step to decide if the allegations in the claimant's pleadings fall 
actually or potentially within the scope of the policy's coverage. This is 
done by comparing the allegations in the complaint to the scope of cover-
age to determine if the complaint alleges a claim that is the type of claim 
covered under the policy. If the court cannot resolve the question be-
cause the insurer's duty to indemnify depends on a factual issue that will 
be resolved in the underlying tort suit (such as whether Brohawn acted 
intentionally or negligently, or whether Pryseski was acting within the 
scope of his employment), the court applies the Brohawn potentiality rule 
and requires the insurer to defend. The insurer is then obligated to de-
fend the suit until such time, if ever, that the only claims remaining are 
ones outside the policy coverage. 110 Accordingly, the duty to defend is a 
continuing obligation that springs into being when a claim comes actu-
ally or potentially within the policy's coverage and ceases only when 
facts show that all potentiality of coverage has been eliminated. 111 Even 
then, an insurer that has begun a defense may have to complete it if its 
withdrawal would prejudice the insured. 112 
It is perhaps doubtful whether the two parts of the comparison test 
can be intertwined, much less whether they involve the identical issue. 
Conceptually, the test always involves two separate inquiries, even if the 
court decides to frame the inquires into one question. 113 The Pryseski 
court's statement that the first and second inquiries of the comparison 
test may be intertwined or involve the identical issue, then, merely re-
flects the fact that the court cannot determine on the basis of the plead-
ings whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify where factual issues 
must be resolved in the underlying tort action. Viewing the two parts as 
intertwined confuses the test for determining the insurer's duty to defend 
with the test for determining the insurer's liability under its duty to in-
1299 (D. Md. 1982); Pryseski, 292 Md. at 194, 438 A.2d at 288; Truck Ins. Exch. v. 
Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 435, 418 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1980). Construing 
the policy against the insurer and in favor of the insured does not automatically 
result in coverage; all it does is resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured. The 
court must still move to the second inquiry to determine if the allegations fall actu-
ally or potentially within the coverage as construed. 
110. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-09, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975); 
see also Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1984). 
111. lA R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.01. 
112. See generally id. A prudent insurer generally will not withdraw unilaterally from a 
defense but will file a declaratory judgment action to have a court declare that the 
defense duty has ceased. 
113. For example, in Edward Winkler & Son v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co, 51 Md. App. 190, 
441 A.2d 1129 (1982), the court of special appeals observed that where determina-
tion of liability required both interpretation of the policy term "accident" and an 
analysis of the tort action to see if it could potentially be regarded as an accident, 
the two issues were "intertwined." /d. at 194,441 A.2d at 1131-32. Nevertheless, 
the court determined the definition of "accident" before finding that the allegations 
against the insured did not describe an "accident" within the meaning of the policy. 
Id. at 195-96, 441 A.2d at 1132. 
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demnify. 114 The scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify (what the pol-
icy covers), however, can be determined in the first prong of the 
comparison test. Once the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify is 
ascertained, the allegations of the claimant's pleadings can then be ana-
lyzed to see if they fall within the policy's coverage. 
The court of appeals' qualification in Pryseski that the potentiality 
rule may be applicable to the first prong of the comparison test has com-
pounded the confusion over the concept of "potentiality of coverage." 
Consequently, inventive attorneys have tried to extend an insurer's liabil-
ity beyond the scope of the policy's coverage by applying the potentiality 
test to the court's interpretation of the policy itself. 115 In Northern As-
surance Co. of America v. EDP Floors, Inc., 116 however, the court of ap-
peals specifically rejected the application of the potentiality rule to the 
first prong of the comparison test. The court stated that applying the 
potentiality rule to the question of the scope of the insurer's duty to in-
demnify "would in effect create a canon of insurance contract interpreta-
tion that gives every benefit of the doubt to the insured, in contravention 
of [the] many holdings that the unambiguous language in an insurance 
contract is to be afforded its ordinary and accepted meaning."117 
The Pryseski comparison test, then, is best seen as a two step process 
in which the court first determines the scope of the coverage and then 
determines whether the pleadings set forth a claim that falls within that 
scope. The first step focuses on the policy and involves the rules of con-
struction. The second step focuses on the allegations in the claimant's 
pleadings and may involve the application of the potentiality rule. The 
test is not whether the policy can be construed to raise a potential duty to 
defend, but whether the allegations raise a potential duty to indemnify. 
The distinction is significant, but too often insureds and insurers try to 
convert the potentiality rule into a rule of contract construction. 118 
114. For a more detailed analysis of the interplay between the comparison test and an 
intertwined coverage question, see Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casu-
alty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982). 
ll5. See, e.g., Pederson v. Republic Ins. Co., 72 Md. App. 661, 532 A.2d 183 (1987). In 
· Pederson, the policyholder argued that because the scope of the coverage of their 
homeowner's policy was unclear, "there was, at least, a potentiality of coverage." 
/d. at 665, 532 A.2d at 185 (emphasis in original). 
116. 311 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987). 
117. /d. at 226, 533 A.2d at 686. 
118. It is apparent that in practice, an insurer is often uncertain about the scope of its 
duty to indemnify, and defends not because it believes that the allegations may give 
rise to a duty to defend but because it fears that its policy could be interpreted to 
broaden the scope of its duty to indemnify. 
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INSURER'S WRONGFUL 
REFUSAL TO DEFEND 
A. Liability for Contract Damages 
23 
An insurer that breaches its duty to defend119 is liable for the con-
tract damages incurred by the insured. 12° Contract damages are those 
that arise naturally from the breach and that were reasonably within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. 121 
They usually consist of legal expenses and fees incurred by the insured in 
defending the underlying tort action, or in bringing or defending a de-
claratory judgment action 122 to determine the coverage issue. 123 
Under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, either 
the insurer or the insured may have the court determine any question of 
coverage under a policy. 124 A declaratory judgment action is an appro-
119. It is axiomatic that if "the insurer's refusal to defend was not wrongful, it is not 
liable for attorneys' fees." Northern Assurance, 311 Md. at 232, 533 A.2d at 690. 
120. The right to recover for breach of a duty to defend applies to the named insured and 
to "any person who is within the policy definition of an insured against whom a 
claim alleging a loss within the policy coverage has been filed." Bankers & Shippers 
Ins. Co. v. Electro Enter., Inc., 287 Md. 641, 649, 415 A.2d 278, 283 (1980). The 
right does not extend to all successful parties in the declaratory judgment action, 
only to successful insureds. Id. at 649-50, 415 A.2d at 283. 
121. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 
Md. 295, 300-01, 29 A.2d 653, 656 (1943). Punitive damages would not be allowed. 
See H. & R. Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 44-46, 338 A.2d 48, 53 (1974) 
(punitive damages cannot be awarded in pure breach of contract actions but are 
recoverable in torts arising out of a contract if actual malice is shown). 
122. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 475 A.2d 509, cert. 
denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984) (successful insured entitled to costs and 
expenses of appeal from declaratory judgment action). Compare Cohen v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 350-63, 258 A.2d 225, 234-39 (1969) (ex-
penses incurred in bringing declaratory judgment action) with Brohawn v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 851 (1975) (expenses 
incurred in defending declaratory judgment action awarded to insured). 
123. American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 A.2d 8, 14-15 
(1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 739 (1981). Attorney's fees are ordinarily not awarded 
in a declaratory judgment action. Maryland Auto Ins. Fund v. Sparks, 42 Md. 
App. 382, 395, 400 A.2d 26 (1979). Awarding an insured attorney's fees and litiga-
tion costs when an insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend is an exception to this 
general rule. See Osbourn, 47 Md. App. at 84, 422 A.2d at 14. This exception is 
"well established." See Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 
538, 489 A.2d 536, 547 (1985). 
124. World Ins. Co. v. Perry, 210 Md. 449, 452, 124 A.2d 259, 260 (1956). The act 
provides that: 
[A]ny person interested under a ... written contract, or other writing 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are 
affected by a ... contract ... may have determined any question of con-
struction or validity arising under the ... contract ... and obtain a decla-
ration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it. 
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 3-406 (1984). A declaratory judgment may 
be sought "notwithstanding the availability of concurrent common law, equitable, 
or extra-ordinary forms of relief." Century I Joint Venture v. United States Fidelity 
& Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 560-61, 493 A.2d 370, 378, cert. denied, 304 Md. 
297, 484 A.2d 1183 (1985). 
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priate and useful means of resolving policy coverage questions when they 
are "independent and separable" from the claims asserted in the underly-
ing tort action. 125 Early resolution of these coverage questions may 
avoid unnecessary expense and delay to both insurer and insured, 126 and 
an insurer would be wise to pursue declaratory relief in most cases where 
it is available. 
"Independent and separable" coverage questions might include the 
enforceability of the policy itself (e.g., whether the insured has paid his 
premiums); technical policy defenses (e.g., whether the insured has 
breached or fulfilled his duties of notification and cooperation); construc-
tion questions (e.g., the definition of the term "occurrence" in Pryseski); 
and factual questions involving issues that are not material to the under-
lying tort action (e.g., whether the driver of a vehicle was driving an 
automobile covered by the insurance policy). 127 These questions have 
nothing to do with the factual issues in the underlying tort action and 
can be tried in a separate declaratory action before, or after the underly-
ing tort action. 128 Moreover, the insurer, in order to save defense costs, 
can move to stay the underlying tort action pending a resolution of the 
declaratory judgment action. A trial court has the discretion to refuse to 
grant a declaratory judgment, 129 and should do so when the declaratory 
judgment action seeks to resolve "intertwined" coverage questions. 130 
The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred in a 
declaratory judgment action is justified on two grounds. 131 First, the in-
125. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 405, 347 A.2d at 849. 
126. /d. 
127. If the insurer believes that it has a legitimate policy defense, it should nevertheless 
defend the insured under a reservation of rights, while at the same time filing a 
declaratory judgment action to determine whether the policy defense is valid. See 
infra notes 249-256 and accompanying text. 
128. As a precaution, if the insurer believes that its policy does not cover the type of 
claim asserted in the claimant's pleadings, it should defend under a reservation of 
rights and seek declaratory relief defining the scope of its obligations. See infra 
notes 249-256 and accompanying text. 
129. The declaratory judgment process should not be used if a declaration of rights 
would not serve a useful purpose or terminate the existing controversy. Mo. CTS. & 
Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-409(a) (1984); accord Century I Joint Venture v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 561, 493 A.2d 370, 379, cert. 
denied, 304 Md. 297, 484 A.2d 1183 (1985); see also Brohawn, 276 Md. at 406, 347 
A.2d at 849 ("If the granting of the [declaratory] judgment would unduly inconven-
ience or burden the parties, or allow one party to wrest control of the litigation from 
another and cause a confusing alteration of the burden of proof, the court should 
refuse to grant the [declaratory] relief .... "). 
130. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 405-06, 347 A.2d at 849; see also Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. 
Prods., 306 Md. 644, 652, 511 A.2d 40, 44 (1986) (The rule that a court should 
decline to decide an issue that is pending in another action is neither jurisdictional 
nor absolute. It is discretionary, and "[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered to 
decide an issue, even though the issue is presented in another pending case between 
the parties in 'very unusual and compelling circumstances.'") (quoting A.S. Abell 
Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 721, 337 A.2d 77, 81 (1975)); Harpy v. Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 Md. App. 474, 545 A.2d 718 (1988). 
131. See Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 350-63, 258 A.2d 225, 
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surer is said to have "authorized" the expenditure of the fees by its fail-
ure to defend. Second, the fees are considered part of the damages 
sustained by the insured as a result of the insurer's breach of its contrac-
tual duty to defend. 132 The insured has the burden of proving the ex-
penses and fees "with the certainty and under the standards ordinarily 
applicable for proof of contractual damages." 133 
A judgment entered against or an amount paid pursuant to a settle-
ment entered into by an insured following his insurer's breach of its duty 
to defend is not necessarily part of the contract damages. The duty to 
defend and the duty to indemnify are independent and distinct obliga-
tions. While the duty to defend arises because of alleged facts, the duty 
to indemnify arises because of actual facts. It is not uncommon for an 
insurer to have a duty to defend but no duty to indemnify. A judgment 
entered against an insured determines his tort liability but does not nec-
essarily determine the insurer's liability under its duty to indemnify. 
Similarly, a settlement between the claimant and the insured extinguishes 
the insured's tort liability but does not establish insurance coverage. 134 
There is no causal nexus between the insurer's breach and the resulting 
judgment. 135 Therefore, an insurer that has breached its duty to defend 
can ordinarily deny it has an obligation to pay a final judgment. 
Under some circumstances, however, the insurer may be collaterally 
estopped from relitigating an issue that has been decided in the underly-
ing tort action. 136 Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation whenever the 
234-39 (1969). The court of appeals has admitted that the recovery of litigation 
expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by an insured in bringing or defending a de-
claratory judgment action is based on an "unrefined" legal theory. See Continental 
Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 537, 489 A.2d 536, 547 (1985). 
132. American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 A.2d 8, 14-15 
(1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 739 (1981). 
133. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enter. Inc., 287 Md. 641, 661, 415 A.2d 278, 
289 (1980); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 
681, 519 A.2d 760, 768 (1987) (quoting Bankers & Shippers, 287 Md. at 661, 415 
A.2d at 289); see also Continental, 302 Md. at 538, 489 A.2d at 547. 
134. In McCarthy v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 24 Misc. 2d 79, 204 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1960), the court distinguished between tort liability and insurance 
coverage: 
The fact that [the insurer] may have had an obligation to defend ... or 
that he violated such obligation may render him liable in damages ... had 
[the insured] expended money to defend himself. It does not by itself 
render (the insurer] liable for the judgment. There is a distinction between 
liability and coverage. 
/d. at 80, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 421; accord Hargis v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 567 
S.W.2d 923, 928 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (cited by Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v Rairigh, 
59 Md. App. 305, 322,475 A.2d 509, 517, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176,482 A.2d 502 
(1984)). 
135. See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 740. 
136. /d. In Farmers Ins. Co. v. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. 443, 675 P.2d 703 (1983) (cited by 
Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517), the court admitted that there is 
"interplay and confusion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the insurer's duty 
under the insurance policy to defend an insured." ld. at 445, 675 P.2d at 705. In 
Maryland, there is additional confusion about the difference between the doctrines 
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issues in the two suits are identical. 137 In general, the insurer "is bound 
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel by the facts determined in the 
trial of such action which are essential to the judgment of tort liabil-
ity."138 Thus, the insurer would not be able to relitigate the tort liability 
of the insured, nor could it contest the amount of the judgment against 
the insured or the legal and factual basis for that judgment. 139 Moreover, 
if the underlying tort action determined an "intertwined" coverage issue, 
such as whether an insured acted intentionally or negligently, or whether 
an employee of the insured was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, then the insurer would be precluded from relitigating that issue. 140 
If, however, the insurer's duty to indemnify rested on a factual issue that 
was not material to the tort liability in the underlying tort action, then 
the insurer would be able to relitigate that issue, even if the issue had 
been decided by the fact finder in the underlying tort action. 141 
of equitable estoppel and collateral estoppel. In Rairigh, for instance, the court 
lumps a discussion of the two doctrines under the heading of "estoppel," even 
though they are separate and independent. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 315, 475 A.2d 
at 514. 
137. Collateral estoppel provides that only those issues which were "actually litigated" in 
the prior suit are conclusive against the same parties litigating the same issues in a 
subsequent proceeding. MacKall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 228, 443 A.2d 98, 
101-02 (1982). The application of collateral estoppel between the insurer and the 
insured is predicated upon an assumed identity of interest of the parties to the insur-
ance policy in opposing the claimant's tort action. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 316, 475 
A.2d at 514. One commentator contends, however, that collateral estoppel is not 
applicable, and that the insurer would always be able to relitigate the coverage issue, 
even if the underlying tort action had decided what he terms "common issues" (i.e., 
"intertwined" factual issues). Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Lia-
bility Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 3 UTAH L. REV. 457, 490-91 (1981). 
The Maryland courts have taken a contrary position, holding that an insurer is 
precluded from relitigating factual issues that were material to the underlying tort 
action and that were actually decided in the underlying tort action. See Brohawn v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396,409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 851 (1975); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310 Md. 274, 528 
A.2d 1286 (1987). The Maryland approach is logical when the factual issue in the 
underlying tort action is identical to the factual issue that determines coverage, and 
the justification for this preclusion is even stronger where the insurer has intervened 
in the underlying tort action. For a discussion of the insurer's right of intervention, 
see Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 113, 523 A.2d at 1069. 
138. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. at 445, 675 P.2d at 705. See generally A. WINDT, supra note 71, 
§ 6.23, at 339 (Insurer is bound "by the resolution of all issues that necessarily had 
to be resolved in adjudicating the underlying [tort] action."). 
139. See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 741. 
140. See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409-10, 347 A.2d at 851-52; Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 112, 
523 A.2d at 1069. 
141. See, e.g., Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. at 445, 675 P.2d at 705 ("A party will not be precluded 
from litigating policy coverage in a subsequent proceeding if the question of cover-
age turns on facts which are nonessential to the judgment of tort liability."). In 
Hargis v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 567 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
(cited by Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517), the court stated that collat-
eral estoppel " 'extends only to points directly involved in the action decided, and 
not to any matter which was only incidentally cognizable, or which came collater-
ally in question.' This is true, even though the matter coming collaterally in ques-
tion may have been judicially passed on." Id. at 928 (quoting Berger v. Kirby, 135 
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In approaching the issue of whether an insurer is precluded from 
relitigating an issue that was adjudicated in, but was not material to, the 
underlying tort action, the court must consider competing interests. On 
one side, there is concern for "judicial economy, finality of decisions, and 
avoidance of conflicting judgments." 142 There is also the desire to "fore-
stall round robin litigation of issues" among the claimant, the insured 
and the insurer. 143 On the other side is the insurer's due process right to 
have its day in court. This fundamental right "may override any consid-
erations of efficiency or expediency served by the minimization of litiga-
tion."144 Thus, "[e]lementary fairness demands a proceeding in which 
the differences between the insurer and insured may be tried." 145 
Although an insurer that breaches its duty to defend relinquishes 
control of the litigation and settlement process, 146 it is nevertheless obli-
gated only for any amounts the insured paid in settling a claim that is 
actually, not just potentially, covered by the policy. 147 The settlement, 
however, must be reasonable and must have been made in good faith and 
with due care. 148 The basis for holding the insurer liable for the insured's 
reasonable, good faith settlement of a covered claim rests on the terms of 
the standard policy that obligate the insurer to pay on behalf of the in-
sured any amount which the insured has become legally obligated to 
pay. 149 The settlement is seen as part of the insured's damages. 
S.W. 1122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), aff'd, 153 S.W. 1130 (Tex. 1913)); see also Glens 
Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 254 A.2d 658 (1969) (issue of 
whether the insured intentionally ran his automobile into the claimant was not 
presented for resolution in the underlying tort action because the claimant sued only 
on a negligence theory). For an explanation of Glens Falls, see Brohawn, 276 Md. at 
414 n.3, 347 A.2d at 853-54 n.3. 
142. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310 
Md. 274, 528 A.2d 1286 (1987). 
143. Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 397 (D. Md. 1978). 
144. Glens Falls, 254 Md. at 134, 254 A.2d at 666. 
145. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 321, 475 A.2d at 517. There is even authority for the 
proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is suspended whenever there ex-
ists a conflict of interest over the defense of the underlying tort action. See Hargis, 
567 S.W.2d at 928; cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS, §§ 57(2), 58 (1982). 
Maryland evidently does not follow this proposition, because it requires the insurer 
to defend despite the conflict of interest and also allows the insurer to intervene in 
the underlying tort action to protect its interests. See infra notes 175-205 and ac-
companying text. 
146. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 
Md. 40, 48, 178 A.2d 872, 875 (1962) ("It is settled law that where there is a denial 
of liability and a refusal to defend on the part of the insurer ... the insured is no 
longer bound by a provision of a policy prohibiting settlement of claims without the 
insurer's consent, or a provision making the insurer's liability dependent on the ob-
taining of a judgment against the insured."). See generally Comment, The Insurer's 
Duty, supra note 6, at 743. 
147. National Paving, 228 Md. at 48, 178 A.2d at 875; Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch. Co., 67 
Md. App. 712, 720, 509 A.2d 711, 715-16 (1986). 
148. National Paving, 228 Md. at 48, 178 A.2d at 875. 
149. See Theodore v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 51 (Alaska 1961). 
In Theodore, the court noted that insurer's liability for settlement of a claim within 
coverage follows from its failure to defend because "that which is paid in a prudent 
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The settlement of a claim that is outside the policy's coverage, in 
contrast, is not a natural consequence of the insurer's failure to defend 
and will not obligate the insurer to indemnify the insured, even if the 
settlement was reasonable and made in good faith. 150 When an insured 
settles both covered and non-covered claims, the insurer is liable for the 
amount of the settlement attributable to covered claims. Maryland has 
not decided whether the insurer or the insured should bear the burden of 
persuading the fact-finder that part or all of the settlement was for cov-
ered claims, but it would appear that in order to foster prudent settle-
ments of tort actions and discourage insurers from wrongfully 
disclaiming coverage, the insurer should bear that burden. lSI 
B. No Creation of Coverage by Waiver or Equitable Estoppel 
The duty to indemnify may not be predicated upon a breach of the 
insurer's duty to defend. 152 Thus, an insurer that breaches its duty to 
defend is not precluded by either waiver153 or equitable estoppel' 54 from 
later raising a defense to its duty to indemnify. Although waiver or equi-
table estoppel may prevent an insurer from asserting technical policy de-
fenses, they may not be used by the insured to expand the policy to create 
coverage that the insurer did not agree to undertake. ISS Therefore, the 
settlement of an action for damages is something which the insured has 'become 
legally obligated to pay' within the meaning of the insurance policy." /d. at 55-56. 
150. See Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 684, 536 A.2d 120, 127, 
cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance 
Co. ofN. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 519 A.2d 760 (1987); Oweiss, 67 Md. App. at 720-
21, 509 A.2d 715-16; see also Western World Ins. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 
F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986). 
151. Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 744 (to balance the policy that an 
insurer should not be liable for risks not paid for by the insured against the policy 
that settlements of lawsuits should be encouraged, the insurer should bear the bur-
den of proving that all or part of insured's settlement was made on grounds outside 
of coverage); see also A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.13, at 162-63. 
152. Kelly v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tenn. 1978). 
153. Waiver is a "voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right." Progres-
sive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ehrhardt, 69 Md. App. 431,443, 518 A.2d 151, 157 (1986). 
In order for a waiver to exist, the " 'acts relied upon ... must be inconsistent with 
an intention to insist upon enforcing ... ' " the party's contractual rights. Ruben-
stein v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 268 Md. 388, 392-93, 302 A.2d 49, 52 (1973) 
(quoting Food Fair v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 531, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (1964)). 
154. "Waiver is closely inter-related and intertwined with estoppel." Gould v. Trans-
american Assoc., 224 Md. 285, 295, 167 A.2d 905, 909 (1961). Estoppel is an equi-
table doctrine that prevents a party from asserting a right because the party has 
conducted himself in such a manner that it would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience to let him assert the right. Wright v. Wagner, 182 Md. 483, 492, 34 
A.2d 441, 446 (1943). While the two terms are often used synonymously, they are 
separate and distinct doctrines. For a discussion of the elements of waiver and es-
toppel, see Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 219-20, 198 A. 419, 427-28 (1938). 
155. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 675, 273 A.2d 431, 435 (1971); Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Coffman, 52 Md. App. 732, 742-43, 451 A.2d 952, 957 
(1982). It is theoretically possible for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to expand 
coverage under certain circumstances. The insured, however, must show detrimen-
tal reliance and, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford 
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insurer will be able to assert that it had no duty to indemnify despite a 
breach of its duty to defend. 156 
The rationale for prohibiting an insured from asserting waiver or 
equitable estoppel is sound. The duty to defend is broader than the duty 
to indemnify, and an insurer may have a duty to deferid but no duty to 
indemnify. 157 An insurer that breaches its contractual duty to defend 
should not be punished by imposing on it the additional burden of an 
expanded duty of indemnification. As one commentator has stated, 
"[t]he insurer's breach of contract should not ... be used as a method of 
. obtaining coverage for the insured that the insured did not purchase." 158 
lfthe insurer owed a duty to defend but no duty to indemnify, then the 
insured would receive the benefit of the bargain through an award of 
defense costs. The judgment would have been the insured's responsibility 
even if the insurer had defended.1s9 
C Defending Insurer's Right to Recover Costs from Co-Insurer That 
Refuses to Defend 
An insured is often protected by several layers of insurance at the 
same time. Generally, the duty to defend rests with the primary carrier, 
and an excess insurer's duty to defend arises only when the primary in-
surer's liability limits are exhausted. 160 The duty is not triggered merely 
because the claims asserted in the tort action exceed the policy limits of 
the primary policy. 161 Although an excess insurer usually does not have 
Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986), it is difficult to imagine how an insured 
could detrimentally rely on the insurer's refusal to defend, especially if the insurer 
notified the insured in writing that it was disclaiming coverage. /d. at 563. A better 
case for estoppel is made when the insurer defends without a reservation of rights 
and then tries to assert that it has no duty to indemnify. See infra notes 243-285 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the application of equitable estoppel, see 
Note, Insurance-Equitable Estoppel-Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Used to Bar 
the Defense of Noncoverage by the Insurer and to Extend Coverage to Risks Not 
Provided for or Excluded Expressly in the Policy, 15 VILL. L. REV. 505 (1970). 
156. See Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch. Co., 67 Md. App. 712, 720, 509 A.2d 711, 715-16 
(1986); A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.35, at 213-16. 
157. See Washington Transit Auth. v. Bullock, 68 Md. App. 20, 40, 509 A.2d 1217, 
1227, cert. denied, 308 Md. 237, 238, 517 A.2d 1120, 1121 (1986). 
158. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.35, at 213 (quoted in Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 317, 
475 A.2d at 515); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 
146-47 n.4, 433 A.2d 1135, 1139 n.4 (1981); cf Neuman v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
271 Md. 636, 654, 319 A.2d 522, 531-32 (1974). 
159. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 317, 475 A.2d at 515 (citing J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4689 (Berdal ed. 1982)) ("Where there is no coverage, the 
greatest injury that the insured could have suffered by a failure to defend is the cost 
of defense-the judgment would have been his responsibility regardless."); see 14 G. 
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW§ 51:73 (2d ed. 1982) (quoted with ap-
proval in Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 318, 475 A.2d at 515). 
160. For an explanation of excess and primary insurance, see supra notes 15, 17 and 
accompanying text. 
161. See Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 323, 475 A.2d at 517-18; cf Fireman's Fund v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 519 A.2d 202 (1987) (excess carrier allowed to sue 
primary carrier for bad faith based on equitable subrogation principles; court did 
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a duty to defend, some excess policies require an excess insurer to defend 
if there is no other applicable insurance. 162 Moreover, when a primary 
insurer wrongfully fails to defend, an excess insurer may be required to 
assume the defense in order to protect the insured's interests. 163 
If the insured is covered by two insurers that are equally obligated 
to defend, and one refuses, the non-breaching insurer is entitled to re-
cover part of the costs it incurred in the defense of the tort action 164 and 
all of the costs of prosecuting a declaratory judgment action. Similarly, if 
an excess insurer assumes the defense following the primary carrier's 
wrongful breach, the primary insurer is liable to the excess carrier for the 
litigation expenses and attorney's fees incurred in defending the underly-
ing tort action and in bringing or defending a declaratory judgment ac-
tion.165 In either situation, the right of the non-breaching insurer to 
recover the costs of prosecuting the declaratory judgment action is based 
on the notion that the breaching carrier "authorized" the expense by its 
refusal to defend, as well as on contractual and equitable subrogation 
principles. 166 
not decide if the primary carrier owed a direct and independent duty to the excess 
carrier). For a general discussion of the duties and obligations that run between 
primary and excess insurers, see Lanzone & Ringel, Duties of a Primary Insurer to 
An Excess Insurer, 61 NEB. L. REv. 259 (1982); Comment, Primary and Excess 
Insurers and Their Common Insured: The Triangular Relationship with No Love 
Lost, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 265 (1981). 
162. See Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 323, 475 A.2d at 517-18. 
163. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp 313, 321 (D. 
Md. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986); see also 
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 896 (D. Md. 
1964). 
164. See Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, 259 Md. 354, 269 A.2d 
826 (1970). In Ryder, both insurers provided excess coverage only, and the court 
ruled that each would share the liability and defense costs equally. Id. at 364-65, 
269 A.2d at 831-32; see also Centennial Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
71 Md. App. 152, 164, 524 A.2d 110, 116 (both insurers provided "pro rata" cover-
age, and the court ruled that each would share the defense and liability costs "on the 
basis of their relative liability exposure"), cert. denied, 310 Md. 491, 530 A.2d 273 
(1987). 
165. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 678-79, 519 
A.2d 760, 767-68 (1987). 
166. /d. at 677-80, 519 A.2d at 767-68 ("[I]nsurer is subrogated to claims of its insured 
against other insurer, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, once the insurer has in-
demnified the insured for his loss."); see also Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford 
Mut. Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp 36 (D. Md. 1985) (defending insurer's recovery against 
breaching insurer is based on principles of contractual and equitable subrogation), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986). In 
Travelers Indemnity, the court also noted that "[t]he rights to which the insurer is 
subrogated have been broadly described as, 'all the rights of recovery of the insured 
of every nature, whatsoever.' " Travelers Indemnity, 69 Md. App. at 680, 519 A.2d 
at 768 (quoting Svea Assurance Co. v. Packham, 92 Md. 464, 465 (1901) (state-
ments in appellants brief). Contractual subrogation is also known as conventional 
subrogation. Equitable subrogation is sometimes called legal subrogation. For a 
discussion of the elements of both, see Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hartford Acci-
dent & lndem. Co., 74 Md. App. 539, 539 A.2d 239 (1988). 
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V. RECURRING ISSUES 
A: The Insured's Responsiblitities 
If an insured has been sued and the claimant's pleadings raise a po-
tentiality of coverage, the insured must comply with the policy's condi-
tions precedent to succesfully enforce the insurer's duties under the 
policy. Under most policies, the insured is contractually obligated to no-
tify the insurer about a potential claim and to cooperate with the insurer 
in the investigation and defense of any claim made against him. 167 An 
insurer is relieved of its duties to defend and indemnify if the insured 
breaches either his duty to notify or his duty to cooperate and the breach 
results in actual prejudice to the insurer. 168 
Under the standard policy, the insured must notify his insurer of 
potential claims as soon as is practicable. 169 In addition, if he is to re-
ceive the litigation protection afforded by the policy, the insured must 
make a timely request for a defense. 170 Notifying the insurer that he has 
been served with the claimant's pleadings and forwarding the pleadings 
to the insurer may not be enough to constitute a defense request, 171 and 
an insured would be wise to send a written request to the insurer along 
with the pleadings. A request made after a judgment has been entered is 
clearly not timely, and the mere entering of the adverse judgment is af-
firmative evidence of actual prejudice to the insurer. 172 
167. For a discussion of the standard cooperation clause, see 2 R. LONG & M. RHODES, 
supra note 67, § 14.01. 
168. Section 482 of article 48A of the Maryland Annotated Code provides: 
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of liability 
insurance issued by it, on the ground that the insured or anyone claiming 
the benefits of the policy through the insured has breached the policy by 
failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not giving requisite notice to the 
insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective only if the insurer establishes, by 
a preponderance of affirmative evidence that such lack of cooperation or 
notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 
669, 673, 273 A.2d 431,433-34 (1971) (failure of insured to cooperate); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 581-84, 219 A.2d 820, 824-26 (1966) 
(lack of requisite notice). 
169. Whether notice of an occurrence was given by the insured to the insurer as soon as 
practicable is a question of fact. See Hearn, 242 Md. at 581, 219 A.2d at 823. 
170. Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 297-98, 482 A.2d 503, 
507-08 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 289, 487 A.2d 292 (1985). 
171. But cf California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App.3d 1, 37-38, 
221 Cal. Rptr. 171, 189 (1985) (constructive notice of a claim to insurer constitutes 
a request for a defense). 
172. See Washington, 60 Md. App. at 296, 482 A.2d at 507. In Washington, the court 
held that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the insured because the notice of a 
claim made after a final judgment was affirmative evidence of prejudice to the in-
surer. Id. at 295-96, 482 A.2d at 507. The court also held that the insurer had no 
duty to reimburse the insured for the costs of defense because the facts at trial 
showed that the claim fell outside of the policy's coverage, implicitly suggesting that 
the insurer did not show that it had been relieved of its defense obligation on the 
grounds that it had been prejudiced by a late notice. Id. at 297-98, 482 A.2d at 507-
08. 
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The insured's duty to cooperate requires him to make a complete 
and truthful disclosure of facts related to the occurrence. In addition, he 
has a good faith obligation to aid in formulating every legitimate defense 
to the underlying tort action and to render assistance at trial. 173 Only by 
fulfilling these duties will the insured receive the benefits of policy. 174 
B. Conflict of Interest Between the Insurer and the Insured 
The duty to defend under the standard policy can be broken into 
two distinct components: the insurer's right to control the defense, and 
the insurer's obligation to pay the cost of the defense. 175 An insurer is 
not relieved of its duty to defend its insured when a conflict of interest 
arises over the defense of the case. 176 The insurer must first inform the 
insured of the nature of the conflict and then give him a choice between 
accepting an independent attorney selected by the insurer and selecting 
his own attorney. 177 If the insured decides to choose his own attorney, 
the insurer must reimburse the insured for the reasonable costs of the 
defense. 178 
There are two types of conflict of interest that can arise between an 
insurer and its insured, and care should be taken to distinguish between 
them. The first is a conflict with regard to the existence of the insurer's 
duty to indemnify the insured; the second is a conflict with regard to the 
insurer's conduct of the defense. 179 The former usually does not require 
that the insured be offered independent counsel. The latter usually re-
quires independent counsel if the insurer's potential liability could be re-
duced by its method of conducting the defense. 180 
Conflicts of interest over the conduct of the defense arise from those 
coverage questions which are "intertwined" in the underlying tort suit. 
173. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 673, 273 A.2d 431, 433-34 (1971). 
174. This assumes, of course, that the insurer has offered its insured a defense. A breach-
ing insurer cannot require the insured to comply with technical policy conditions. 
See infra text accompanying notes 232-235. 
175. See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 738. 
176. /d.; see also Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 
851 (1975). 
177. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 414-15, 347 A.2d at 854. What constitutes an "independent 
counsel" is a difficult question. It "may simply mean attorneys who are not direct 
employees of the insurer. Or, more expansively viewed, it may mean attorneys who 
do not regularly represent the insurer." Morris, supra note 137, at 487-88 (footnote 
omitted). Windt suggests that in order to be an independent counsel, an attorney 
retained by an insurer to represent an insured in a conflict of interest situation must 
not be asked to comment on any coverage question by the insurer. Moreover, the 
attorney's role must be explained to the insured in writing, and copies of the attor-
ney's status reports should be sent to the insured. If these requirements are met, 
Windt concludes, "there is no reason· why the insurer should, in theory, be pre-
cluded from hiring as independent counsel an attorney [whom] it has used in the 
past to represent the insurer's interests." A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.20, at 179. 
178. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 415, 347 A.2d at 854. See generally Comment, The Insurer's 
Duty, supra note 6, at 738. 
179. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.18. 
180. /d. 
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A conflict may also arise from a "separate and distinct" coverage ques-
tion, but such a conflict does not require the insurer to offer the insured a 
choice of independent counsel.1 81 Independent counsel need be offered 
only if a potentiality of coverage is created by an intertwined factual issue 
and the insurer will be bound by the results in the underlying tort 
action. 182 
Brohawn, in which the claimants raised both intentional tort and 
negligence claims, illustrates a common conflict of interest over the con-
duct of the case. The best result for both the insurer and the insured 
would have been for the insured to be found not liable on either of the 
claimants' theories. The insurer, however, would not have been obli-
gated to pay if the insured were found liable on the intentional tort count, 
because intentional torts were not covered by the policy. Conversly, the 
insured would have prefered to be found liable, if at all, on the negligence 
count, which was covered by the policy. Moreover, both the insured and 
the insurer would have been bound by the results in the tort action. 
These differing interests require the insurer to offer the insured a choice 
of independent counsel in order to protect against the possible manipula-
tion of the defense to establish noncoverage. 
The existence of a conflict of interest over the conduct of the defense 
in a potentiality situation varies from case to case. A Brohawn-type com-
plaint gives rise to an inherent conflict. The conflict of interest doctrine, 
however, is not limited to cases in which the pleadings allege negligence 
and intentional torts as alternative theories of recovery. 183 A conflict of 
interest over the conduct of the defense arises any time the insurer can 
shape the defense to establish noncoverage. 184 Intertwined coverage 
181. One commentator, however, has argued that: 
[A)n inherent conflict of interest exists whenever the insurer disclaims lia-
bility for a suit it seeks to defend. The insured may have legitimate fears 
regarding the insurer's motivation to settle or otherwise provide a vigorous 
defense. In addition, the ever present danger that the insured may be re-
quired to produce evidence not otherwise available to the insurer that 
could later be used to establish non-coverage justifies the insured's demand 
that the insurer relinquish exclusive control of the defense. 
Comment, Reservation of Rights Notices and Nonwaiver Ageements, 12 PAC. L.J. 
763, 777-78 (1981) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Comment, Reservation of 
Rights]. Contra A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.18. 
182. See generally Browne, supra note 70, at 19 n. 5 ("If the results in the tort action are 
immaterial as far as the coverage question is concerned, neither party will have any 
incentive to force those results one way or the other, and there is no conflict."). 
183. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 320, 475 A.2d 509, 516, 
cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984). 
184. In Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. 
Md. 1982), the court stated: 
[I]f the ... claimants were to prevail at all, [the insurer] would certainly 
prefer that they do so with respect to any claim other than the [covered] 
claim. Under such circumstances, it is not unreasonable for the [insureds] 
to be concerned as to the adequacy of representation by counsel not in-
dependent of the insurer. Consequently, they are entitled to independent 
counsel under Brohawn. 
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questions, such as whether the insured was acting within the scope of his 
employment, 185 whether the insured was an employee or an independent 
contractor, 186 whether the insured acted as an employee or in some other 
capacity, 187 or even whether the insured's tortious acts fell within the 
applicable policy dates 188 create conflicts of interest over the defense of 
the case and require the insurer to offer the insured a choice of counsel. 
Conflicts of interest in the conduct of the defense may also work to 
the disadvantage of an insurer. 189 The insurer may be tempted to shape 
the defense to establish noncoverage. The insured, on the other hand, 
may have a conflict with his obligation to cooperate with the defense 
because he has a desire to manipulate the facts to establish coverage. 
Providing the insured with independent counsel, however, eliminates 
only the possibility that the insurer will shape the defense to establish 
noncoverage. It does not prevent the insured from shaping the defense to 
establish coverage to the detriment of the insurer. 190 
The insurer may use two strategies to prevent this outcome. First, 
even if independent counsel is chosen, the insurer may still monitor the 
case and participate in the investigation, defense and settlement. 191 The 
insurer need relinquish only exclusive control of the defense. Neverthe-
less, participation in a defense conducted by independent counsel is not 
/d. at 1304. 
185. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 195-96, 438 A.2d 
282, 286-87 (1981); Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Chillum Corp., 71 Md. App. 552, 556-
59, 526 A.2d 642, 644-45, cert. denied, 311 Md. 22, 532 A.2d 168 (1987). 
186. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 
228 Md. 40, 49-54, 178 A.2d 872, 876-78 (1962). 
187. See, e.g., Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lee, 62 Md. App. 176, 185, 488 A.2d 988, 992-
93, cert. denied, 303 Md. 471, 494 A.2d 939 (1984). 
188. See, e.g., Southern Md., 539 F. Supp. at 1304. 
189. Browne, supra note 70, at 24. 
190. /d. 
191. See Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, at 779. Such a participation 
occurred in Saba v. Darling, 72 Md. App. 487, 531 A.2d 696 (1987), cert. granted, 
311 Md. 698, 537 A.2d 202 (1988), where Darling was sued for assault and negli-
gence. The insurer complied with its Brohawn duty by supplying Darling with in-
dependent counsel to defend the negligence count, which was covered by the policy, 
and by paying for a private attorney retained by Darling to defend the noncovered 
assault count. At the close of his case, the plaintiff dismissed the assault count, 
evidently knowing that Darling's policy excluded coverage for bodily injury in-
tended by the insured. /d. at 489 n.l, 531 A.2d at 696 n.l. Darling's attorneys then 
moved for judgment on the negligence count. The court denied the motion for judg-
ment and let the case go to the jury. Although the jury returned a verdict for Dar-
ling, the insurer would have been collaterally estopped from denying a duty to 
indemnify if the jury had returned a verdict against him. 
Had the plaintiff's attorney not dismissed the assault count, it is unlikely that 
either of Darling's attorneys would have moved for judgment on the negligence 
count, because the motion, if granted, would have exposed Darling to personal lia-
bility. Darling's private attorney would undoubtedly have tried to protect his client 
by letting the negligence count go to the jury. Darling's other attorney, although 
hired by the insurer, owed Darling his utmost loyalty and could not have jeopard-
ized Darling's interests by moving for judgment on the negligence count in order to 
protect the insurer's interests. 
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an entirely effective way for an insurer to protect its interests. Because 
an insurer cannot directly advance its interests at the expense of the in-
sured, participation often provides little more than means for monitoring 
the progress of a case. 
A second and more effective means of controlling the insured's abil-
ity to shape the defense arises from the insurer's right to intervene in the 
suit to protect its own interests. An insurer with a potentiality issue that 
cannot be litigated in a separate declaratory judgment action has the 
right to intervene as a party in the underlying tort action brought against 
its insured. 192 The insurer must have a legitimate interest in order to 
intervene and must make a timely motion. 193 The right is not unquali-
fied, and certain safeguards must be met in order to protect the insured 
from being "cast adrift and left to fend for himself or herself against the 
wealth and resources of the carrier."194 Before intervening, the insurer 
must fulfill its defense obligation by supplying independent counsel to its 
insured or by paying the costs of the insured's counsel. 195 This safeguard 
places both the insured and the insurer on an equal economic footing and 
prevents the insurer from wresting control of the tort litigation from the 
claimants and the insured.l96 
Intervention is designed to prevent the insured, either by himself or 
in collusion with the claimant, from shaping the facts to establish cover-
age. If the insurer were not able to intervene, then it might be collater-
ally estopped from raising the intertwined factual issues in a subsequent 
action. 197 This fear of collusion between the insured and the claimant is 
well-founded, for inventive attorneys have attempted to bind an insurer 
by various means. 198 Nevertheless, intervention is not wholly satisfac-
192. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310 
Md. 274, 528 A.2d 1286 (1987). 
193. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md. App. 615, 519 A.2d 219 (1987) (intervention 
not allowed because of untimeliness of request and insurer's lack of sufficient inter-
est). A "legitimate interest" is a "direct, significant legally protectable interest." 
Id. at 628, 519 A.2d at 226. 
Maryland Rule 2-214 establishes two types of intervention: intervention of 
right and permissive intervention. See MD. R. 2-214(a), (b). The rule does not spec-
ify a time limit for filing a motion to intervene, except to state that the motion must 
be "timely." MD. R. 2-214(a), (b)(1). For a discussion of the factors to be consid-
ered in determining the timeliness of a motion to intervene, see Maryland Radiologi-
cal Soc'y v. Health Serv. Cost Review Comm'n, 285 Md. 383, 402 A.2d 907 (1979). 
194. Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 113, 523 A.2d at 1069. 
195. /d. Only an insurer that honors its duty to defend by providing its insured with 
counsel or paying for the insured's choice of counsel may intervene. A disclaiming 
insurer has no right to intervene because it has no legally sufficient interest. See 
Birdsong, 69 Md. App. at 629-30, 519 A.2d at 226. 
196. Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 114, 523 A.2d at 1070. 
197. See supra notes 136-145 and accompanying text. 
198. Collusion can exist at any stage in the litigation-in the pleading stage, in settlement 
negotiations between the claimant and the insured, and during trial. In Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 475 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 301 Md. 
176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984), the court of special appeals noted that a consent judg-
ment conditioned upon the claimant's collecting the judgment from the insured's 
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tory from the insurer's standpoint. It projects the question of the exist-
ence and availability of insurance into a tort action. 199 Furthermore, 
intervention by an insurer in an underlying tort action based on alterna-
tive theories of negligent and intentional acts might actually increase the 
insurer's exposure under the policy. At trial, for example, the insurer 
might argue that the insured acted intentionally to avoid the policy cov-
erage for negligence. If, however, the jury found that the insured actu-
ally acted recklessly as well as negligently, and it awarded punitiye 
damages, the insurer would have contributed unwillingly to its own lia-
bility exposure. 200 · 
Participation in the defense or outright intervention treats only a 
symptom of the conflict of interest problem. As the drafter of the policy, 
the insurer has the ability to treat the cause of the problem by redrafting 
its defense obligation. For example, it could make the duty to defend 
dependent on the duty to indemnify or on the claimant's alleging facts 
which are actually within coverage. An insurer could also include a pro-
vision limiting its duty to defend the insured when a conflict of interest 
arises. 201 The insured would then be responsible for his own defense 
costs, but the insurer would still face possible liability l!nder its duty to 
indemnify. The advantage of these limiting provisions, however, should 
be weighed against the insurer's desire "to retain the absolute right to 
control the defense where it may be liable."202 
A better approach may be for the insurer to limit its exposure by 
providing that, in the case of a conflict of interest, the insured does not 
have an unfettered choice of independent counsel but must choose from a 
list of attorneys provided by the insurer. 203 Similarly, the policy could 
allow the initial choice to lie with the insured but require the insurer's 
insurer would not bar the insurer from later denying coverage under its duty to 
indemnify. Giving a preclusive effect to such a consent judgment would leave the 
claimant and the insured free "to stipulate away the right of an absent insurer to 
raise a legitimate defense to its liability" when the claimant seeks garnishment after 
the entry of the court judgment. Id. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517. But see Steyer v. 
Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978). 
199. While the existence and contents of a liability insurance policy are discoverable 
under Maryland Rule 2-402(b), the fact that a party carries liability insurance is not 
admissible to show that the party acted negligently. Snowhite v. State ex rei. Ten-
nant, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966). It may be admissible for other purposes. 
See generally, 5 L. MCLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE 
§§ 411.1, 411.2 (1987). 
200. This conclusion assumes, of course, that punitive damages are not excluded by the 
policy. See First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 
(1978) (punitive damages must be expressJy excluded from a policy). The Brohawn 
court addressed this issue briefly and from another direction, noting that the conflict 
of interest between Transamerica and Brohawn would place Transamerica in a posi-
tion to expose its insured to potential punitive damages. Brohawn v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975). 
201. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 410, 347 A.2d at 851. 
202. ld. 
203. See Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 635, 240 A.2d 397, 404 (1968). 
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approval of the choice.204 Under either option, the insurer would retain 
partial control over the defense of the case and could participate in the 
settlement process. These choices are available to the insurers if they are 
willing to deviate from old, familiar procedures and standard policy 
language. 205 
C Notice Pleadings 
The "notice" theory of pleading underlying the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure206 creates an inherent conflict with the exclusive plead-
ing rule.207 The Federal Rules require only that the allegations in a 
pleading be "simple, concise and direct"208 and that the pleading set 
forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [claim-
ant] is entitled to relief."209 There is no requirement that a pleading state 
"facts" supporting the allegations.210 While "no pleading system oper-
ates with sufficient precision to predict insurance coverage,"211 the notice 
pleading system assails the validity and efficacy of the exclusive pleading 
rule. 212 The stricter pleading requirements of the past gave ari insurer 
substantially more information on which to decide a duty-to-defend 
204. In both Rhode Island and New York, the insured's choice of counsel in a conflict-
of-interest situation must be approved by the insurer. The insurer can reject the 
insured's attorney, but must do so in good faith. See id. at 635, 240 A.2d at 404; 
New York State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1984). 
205. Insurers appear to be wedded to the standard forms, and change from standard 
provisions is a slow process. In 1978, for example, the court of appeals held that 
punitive damages were covered by liability policies unless specifically excluded from 
coverage. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 
(1978). The obvious solution for the insurers was to exclude punitive damages from 
coverage, but most policies issued today still do not contain the necessary exclusion. 
But see Treanor, Mischief with Malice: A Review of Liability for Punitive Damages 
and the Insured's Right to Indemnity Against An Exemplary Award, 8 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 222, 263-70 (1979) (suggesting that the Maryland Insurance Division has hesi-
tated to permit exclusion of punitive damages without explicit direction from the 
judiciary or legislature). 
206. See generally 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GOTHER JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE ~ 8.13, at 8-61 to 8-62 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE). The purpose of the Federal Rules "is to give fair notice of the claim asserted 
so as to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, to allow for the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show the type of case brought, so 
that it may be assigned to the proper form of trial." /d. 
207. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text. 
208. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(l). 
209. /d. 8(a)(2). 
210. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 206, § 8.13, at 8-60, 8-66. 
211. lA R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.02. 
212. This observation, made by many commentators, is summed up nicely by Long and 
Rhodes: 
I d. 
Indeed, notice pleading may become so ambiguous and non-committal 
that the defendants do not reasonably know what is being alleged. In ad-
dition, due to the vague nature of notice pleadings, it is quite common 
today for an insurer to either know of or be able to readily discover facts 
which would require it to defend if actually pled by the claimant. 
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question.213 The continued viability of the exclusive pleading rule in 
light of the notice theory underlying current pleading systems has been 
questioned by both commentators214 and the courts.215 
The Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, although modeled after the 
Federal Rules, have not adopted the "notice" theory ofpleading.216 Like 
the Federal Rules, the Maryland Rules require that a complaint be "sim-
ple, concise and direct."217 Unlike the federal mandate of a "short and 
plain statement of the claim," however, the Maryland Rules require "a 
clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action."218 
From an insurer's standpoint, the Maryland Rules' retention of "fact" 
pleading alleviates much of the insurer's burden of determining whether 
it must defend its insured. 
Nevertheless, the Maryland Rules are problematic in determining 
when a pleading establishes an insurer's duty to defend. With technical 
forms of pleading eliminated,219 the Maryland Rules can be considered a 
modified "notice" pleading system. The rules allow a claimant to "set 
forth two or more statements of a claim ... alternatively or hypotheti-
cally."220 Moreover, a claimant "may also state as many separate claims 
213. See Babcock & Wilcox v. Parsons, 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 206, §§ 8.04, 8.13. 
214. See, e.g., Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 749. 
215. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 
(1966). In Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 
(1955), the court criticized the exclusive pleading rule, stating that "[t]he draftsman 
of the complaint against the insured is not interested in the question of coverage 
which later arises between insurer and insured." Id. at 251, 286 P.2d at 1003. This 
conclusion, however, is questionable. In niost cases, the draftsman is concerned 
with the question of insurance, since the existence of insurance may provide his 
client with a means of recovering a judgment from an otherwise insolvent party. 
The facts of Brohawn, for example, demonstrate that the plaintiffs' attorney 
amended the complaint by adding a negligence count in order to provide his clients 
access to Brohawn's liability policy. See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 
Md. 396, 400-01, 347 A.2d 842, 846 (1975); see also supra notes 53-56 and accompa-
nying text. This practice is quite common in cases centering on an assault, and 
almost every plaintiffs' attorney knows that he should add a simple negligence count 
in order to create a "potentiality of coverage." See Browne, supra note 70, at 27-28. 
216. Compare MD. R. 2-303(a) ("All averments of claim ... shall be made in numbered 
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a 
statement of a single set of circumstances ... . ")with id. 2-303(b) ("A pleading shall 
contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader's enti-
tlement to relief or ground of defense."). See generally P. NIEMEYER & L. RICH-
ARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 135 (1984) (Rule 2-305 "continues the 
distinction which has always existed between pleading in the Maryland Courts and 
the federal courts. While F[ed]. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that a pleading contain a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, 
[Maryland Rule 2-305] requires a statement of facts essential to state a cause of 
action."). 
217. Mo. R. 2-303(b). 
218. ld. 2-305; cf id. 2-303(b) (A complaint shall "contain only such statements of fact 
as may be necessary to show the pleader's entitlement to relief .... "). 
219. ld. 2-303(b). 
220. ld. 2-303(c). 
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or defenses as [he] has, regardless of consistency and whether based on 
legal or equitable grounds."221 The admonition that a pleading be "sim-
ple, concise and direct," along with acceptance of multiple count com-
plaints and inconsistent allegations, affect the insurer's defense 
responsibility by creating a pleading environment in which "potentiali-
ties" of coverage based on ambiguous, vague, incomplete, or broad· and 
conclusory allegations flourish. 
Both the Federal and Maryland Rules provide mechanisms for al-
lowing an insurer to assess its duty to defend when it is faced with a bare-
bones or ambiguous pleading. A motion for a more definite statement 
and the various discovery devices can be used to help an insurer evaluate 
its duty to defend completely, but these procedures can only be used after 
the insurer has assumed the defense. Thus, an insurer faced with a bare-
bones or ambiguous pleading under either the Federal or the Maryland 
Rules should assume the defense under a reservation of rights, 222 then 
monitor the case closely to determine if information obtained through 
the normal litigation process relieves it of its duty to defend.223 If the 
information shows that its defense duties have ended, the insurer should 
file a declaratory judgment action to have the court determine its rights. 
A prudent insurer will not withdraw without obtaining a court declara-
tion that its defense obligation has ceased. 
D. • Apportionment 
If the insurer has a duty to defend any part of a multiple-count law-
suit, then it generally has the duty to defend the entire lawsuit.224 In the 
usual case, when the insurer assumes the defense it is responsible for de-
fending all the allegations against the insured, not merely those that fall 
actually or potentially within the coverage.225 In some situations, how-
ever, when defense costs can be readily apportioned between covered and 
noncovered items, the insurer can provide a partial defense. This can be 
done in two ways. If the insured has accepted the insurer's independent 
counsel, then the independent counsel would defend only those counts 
which fall actually or potentially within coverage. The insured would be 
tesponsible for retaining his own attorney to defend those counts that fall 
221. /d. 
222. See infra notes 249-256 and accompanying text. 
223. In Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978), the court stated that 
the insurer had a continuing duty to defend that would be relieved when, if ever, the 
facts showed that the claimant's claims were limited to those outside of coverage. 
/d. at 389; see also supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text. 
224. See, e.g., Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 
1295, 1299 (D. Md. 1982); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-08, 
347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975); Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436 
A.2d 493 (1981), cert. denied, 292 Md. 596 (1982); Minnick's, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. 
Co., 47 Md. App. 329, 422 A.2d 1028 (1980); accord Continental Casualty Co. v. 
Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985). 
225. See Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 678-79, 536 A.2d 120, 
124, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988). 
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outside of coverage.226 Alternatively, if the insured has selected his own 
independent attorney, then the insurer would pay that attorney for the 
cost of defending the counts that fall actually or potentially within cover-
age. In a multiple c.ount claim, for instance, an insurer may apportion 
the defense costs between counts that are actually or potentially covered 
and counts that are not covered, if there is a reasonable means of prop-
erly apportioning the costs.227 In the usual case, however, there is no 
reasonable means of prorating the costs, and separate representation for 
covered and noncovered counts is not feasible. 228 
If apportionment is possible and the insured has retained his own 
counsel, then the insurer is responsible only for the fees and expenses that 
are reasonably related to the defense of a covered claim.229 Legal fees 
and services are reasonably related to a covered count if they would have 
been rendered by reasonably competent counsel engaged to defend a suit 
involving only the covered count. 230 The insured has the burden of prov-
ing that a given item of legal expense or service was reasonably related to 
the defense of a covered count. 2 31 
VI. AN INSURER'S ALTERNATIVES 
A. Decline to Defend 
An insurer faced with a potentiality question has several alterna-
tives. 232 First, it may refuse to defend. This approach is neither practical 
nor advisable. A disclaiming insurer waives its right to rely on technical 
policy defenses and provisions. 233 It also loses the right to insist on the 
insured's cooperation with the investigation and defense of the underly-
ing tort action, and it surrenders the ability to select defense counsel and 
control the litigation. The insurer's disclaimer also allows the insured to 
enter into settlements and releases without the insurer's consent, thus 
226. See Minnick's, 47 Md. App. at 333-34, 422 A.2d at 1029-30. 
227. See Steyer, 450 F. Supp. at 390; see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mogavero, 640 F. Supp. 
84 (D. Md. 1986). In Mogavero, the court noted that requiring an insurer to provide 
a defense for all of the claims in a multiple count complaint, where it was clear that 
there was no potentiality of coverage for the overwhelming majority of the claims, 
would substantially expand the insurer's obligations under the policy beyond those 
reasonably contemplated by the parties. ld. at 87. 
228. Compare Brohawn, 276 Md. at 407, 347 A.2d at 850-52 (separate representation not 
feasible) with Minnick's, 47 Md. App. at 333-34, 422 A.2d at 1030 (separate repre-
sentation feasible). 
229. Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985). 
230. Id. at 532, 489 A.2d at 544. 
231. ld. But see Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 
1295 (D. Md. 1982) (insurer may bear burden of proving feasibility of 
apportionment). 
232. Cf Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 136, 254 A.2d 658, 666-
67 (1969) (an insurer has three options: decline to defend; defend under reservation; 
or seek declaratory judgment). See generally Dohoney, supra note 6, at 471. 
233. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 
Md. 40, 47-49, 178 A.2d 872, 875-76 (1962). 
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destroying the insurer's subrogation rights.234 Finally, a refusal to de-
fend may lead to the insurer's breaching its good faith duty to settle 
within policy limits.z3s 
Under some circumstances it may appear that there are legitimate 
practical and tactical reasons for flatly refusing to defend. An insurer 
faced with a potentiality problem would save the cost of defense if it were 
subsequently shown that the refusal was proper. Furthermore, even 
where coverage is fairly certain, an insurer might weigh the likelihood of 
various outcomes and conclude that the benefits of disclaiming coverage 
outweigh the risks. 236 
Perhaps the primary reason for not defending is the belief that the 
denial will control defense costs by making the insured's attorney aware 
that he might have to look solely to a cost-conscious client for his fees, 
rather than to the economic resources of an insurance carrier. Although 
this theory is attractive, its true economic value is questionable. The in-
sured's independent counsel is already restrained by the concept of "rea-
sonable" attorney's fees. In addition, the insured's attorney may charge 
a higher hourly rate than does the insurer's defense counsel, thus nullify-
ing the economic benefit of limiting the insured's attorney's hours. The 
insurer is not entitled to determine the reasonableness of the fees by com-
paring them to insurance defense counsel fees; reasonable fees are deter-
mined by the market as a whole, not by the insurance defense market.237 
The insurer's ability to restrain the fees of an independent counsel is 
therefore doubtful at best. 238 
Other factors indicate that disclaiming coverage, even in those cases 
involving "close" coverage questions, is extremely risky. A judgment 
against the insured may be substantially higher than if the insurer had 
defended and thus had been able to control the litigation.239 Further-
more, if courts extend the tort of bad faith to the duty to defend, an 
insurer that refuses to defend for economic reasons could be held liable 
for consequential damages beyond ordinary contract damages.240 
The final reason for refusing to defend is that it places the burden on 
the insured to file a declaratory judgment action to establish the insurer's 
defense duty. 241 This small benefit is substantially outweighed by the fact 
234. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 3.10, at 123; see also id. § 5.15, at 261. 
235. See id. § 5.01, at 232-35. 
236. The insurer's benefits would be maximized, for example, if the refusal to defend acts 
as an additional economic restraint on the insured's counsel; if the insured is likely 
to prevail in the underlying tort action or settlement is likely to be either moderate 
or based on matters outside coverage; and if the insurer is able to settle the insured's 
declaratory judgment action and claim for damages arising from the insurer's 
breach for a reduced amount. 
237. See Browne, supra note 70, at 25. 
238. See Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, at 779. 
239. See Browne, supra note 70, at 25. 
240. See infra notes 286-307 and accompanying text. 
241. The statute of limitations, under the discovery standard generally applicable in 
Maryland, begins to run when the insured discovers that the insurer will not defend. 
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that the insurer will be responsible for the insured's attorney's fees in 
both a declaratory judgment action, if the insured is successful, and in 
the underlying tort action. 
In general, then, an insurer's option of refusing to defend is usually 
outweighed by practical considerations. The decision to decline to de-
fend must be a studied one, and it will be the rare case where it will be 
found advisable. Moreover, if the tort of bad faith is extended to the 
duty to defend, then refusing to defend will lose what little practical and 
tactical advantage it has. Accordingly, an insurer should hesitate to re-
fuse to defend in all but the clearest of cases. 
B. Defend Without Reservation 
The second alternative for an insurer faced with a potentiality issue 
is to defend without reservation. This is equally as unappealing as the 
first alternative. An insurer that defends without reservation will be 
deemed to have waived its technical policy defenses,242 and under certain 
circumstances, it may also be estopped from asserting substantive policy 
defenses. 243 In particular, it may be prevented from asserting that it has 
no duty to indemnify the insured if the insured can establish that he det-
rimentally relied on the insurer's assuming the defense without 
reservation. 
Although it is clear that insurance coverage cannot be created or 
expanded by the doctrine of waiver,244 there is some question whether it 
See Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985) 
(citing American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 A.2d 8, 
14-15 (1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 739 (1981)), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, 
Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986). 
242. Columbia Casualty Co. v Ingram, 154 Md. 360, 140 A. 601 (1928); London & Lan-
cashire lndem. Co. v. Cosgriff, 144 Md. 660, 125 A. 529 (1924). 
243. In considering whether an insurer may waive an inapplicability of its policy, the 
court of appeals, in Bowers & Kaufman v. Bothwell, 152 Md. 392, 136 A. 892 
(1927), noted that: 
[I)t is not a forfeiture that is to be found waived, nor a violation of a 
condition or any irregularity; it is an inapplicability of the policy, so that 
the waiver argued for would be, in effect, an extension of the contract 
beyond its defined limits, or a new contract. Such an extension would, at 
least, we think, require an estoppel, if not a new consideration, to support 
it. 
/d. at 397, 136 A. at 894. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 A. 
838 (1934), the court, after reviewing its decision in Bowers, stated: 
And it is doubted whether an estoppel, strictly speaking, could suffice to 
create a new contract. ... Waiver or estoppel can only have a field of 
operation when the subject-matter is within the terms of the contract .... 
Whatever the description of the process, it must include the ordinary es-
sentials of a contract and among them a meeting of the minds of the par-
ties in the [extension of the original contract). 
/d. at 620-21, 175 A. at 840; see also supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text. 
244. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber. Co., 179 F. Supp. 699 
(D. Md. 1959); see also supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text. 
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can be extended by the doctrine of estoppel.245 Maryland cases invaria-
bly treat waiver and estoppel together and then conclude simply that 
coverage cannot be created by waiver.246 What the courts seem to sug-
gest in their analyses is that as a matter of law, waiver cannot expand 
coverage, and under the facts of the various cases, estoppel will rarely 
expand coverage. 247 The implication of these analyses, however, is that 
under proper circumstances an insurer can be estopped from denying it 
has a duty to indemnify. For example, if the potentiality of coverage 
created a conflict of interest and the insured was not allowed to choose 
his own counsel, then the insured's reliance on the insurer's unqualified 
defense and his forfeiture of his right to independent counsel might jus-
tify finding an estoppel. The insured surely has been misled; whether he 
has been injured and has changed his position for the worse will depend 
upon the facts of each case. 248 If estoppel can expand coverage under 
these circumstances, then an insurer that chooses to defend without re-
serving its right to raise a defense to its duty to indemnify may be pre-
cluded from later asserting that it has no duty to indemnify. 
C Defend Under Reservation 
A third alternative, and the preferable one, is for the insurer to offer 
the insured a defense under either a non-waiver agreement or a reserva-
tion-of-rights notice. The insurer can then pursue a declaratory judg-
245. See Snyder v. Travelers Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 76 (D. Md. 1966) (applying Mary-
land law). Noting that the subject matter of the insurance coverage may not be 
extended by waiver, the court stated that this rule "may not be correct as to the 
doctrine of estoppel." /d. at 80. The court, however, concluded that under the facts 
of the case, the essential elements of an estoppel were missing. /d. 
246. For an example of this type of analysis, see Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 
v. Bullock, 68 Md. App. 20, 39-40, 509 A.2d 1217, 1226-27, cert. denied, 308 Md. 
237, 517 A.2d 1120 (1986). 
247. See Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977) 
(applying Maryland law). In Haines, the court stated: 
Even assuming that in a proper case, coverage can be afforded or extended 
by estoppel ... the rule in Maryland is that: For principles of estoppel to 
be applicable, the party claiming the benefit of estoppel must have been 
misled to his injury and changed his position for the worse, having be-
lieved and relied upon the representations of the party sought to be 
estopped. 
/d. at 442 (citations omitted). The court, after stating the necessary elements of an 
estoppel, concluded: 
In the face of the clear language of the St. Paul [reservation-of-rights] let-
ter, plaintiffs cannot assert a good faith reliance based on prior or subse-
quent acts by St. Paul. Plaintiffs accepted the defense subject to the 
conditions imposed in the letter which included St. Paul's absolute right to 
withdraw at any time upon written notice .... Knowing the limits of St. 
Paul's undertaking, plaintiffs cannot assert that defendant is estopped 
from denying coverage. 
/d. at 443; see also Snyder, 251 F. Supp. at 80 (applying Maryland law) (essential 
elements of an estoppel were missing under the facts of the case). 
248. See Haines, 428 F. Supp. at 442. 
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ment action249 if coverage h,inges on issues "independent and separable" 
from the underlying tort action. 
When an insurer wants to defend despite a conflict of interest, it 
should, as a precaution, make its position known to its insured by either 
entering into a non-waiver agreement with the insured or by sending the 
insured a reservation-of-rights notice. Non-waiver agreements and reser-
vation-of-rights notices are designed to allow the insurer to honor its 
duty to defend while preserving its right to deny coverage under its duty 
to indemnify. These precautionary devices benefit both the insurer and 
the insured. 250 The non-waiver agreement or reservation-of-rights notice 
allows the insurer to control the defense, contain defense costs, effect a 
reasonable settlement and avoid litigation expenses in a declaratory judg-
ment action. The insured in tum receives a defense, avoids litigation ex-
penses in a declaratory action and receives the benefit of any settlement 
entered into by the insurer.25t 
Both non-waiver agreements and reservation-of-rights notices are 
valid in Maryland.252 The former is a bilateral agreement between the 
insurer and insured; the latter is a unilateral notice, usually in the form of 
a letter from the insurer, which becomes binding if the insured does not 
object. 253 The agreement and notice are designed to inform the insured 
that while the insurer is defending the action, it believes it has no obliga-
tion to indemnify him. 
Although Maryland courts have recognized the existence and exten-
sive use of both non-waiver agreements and reservation-of-rights no-
tices/54 the courts have not clearly delineated what they must contain to 
be valid. In order to be effective, non-waiver agreements and reservation-
of-rights notices should provide sufficient information to enable the in-
sured to make an informed judgment on whether he wants the insurer to 
continue with the defense.255 A reservation-of-rights notice should also 
indicate that the insured's silence will constitute an acceptance of the 
249. An insurer also has the option to seek declaratory relief if it declines to defend or 
defends without reservation. See Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Deter-
mine a Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L. REV. 87, 
92 (1965). 
250. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber Co., 179 F. Supp. 
699, 705 (D. Md. 1959). 
251. See generally Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, at 764. 
252. Island Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 247 F. Supp. 387 (D. Md. 1965). 
253. Id. at 392. 
254. See Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber Co., 179 F. Supp. at 704-05; see also Hardware 
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Mitnick, 180 Md. 604, 26 A.2d 393 (1942). 
255. Not every reservation-of-rights letter gives rise to a conflict of interests. See gener-
ally A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.18, at 169-74. One commentator has stated that a 
non-waiver agreement or a reservation-of-rights notice must provide the insured 
with enough information for him to make "a knowing, intelligent wavier" of his 
right to an unconditional defense. Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, 
at 785-86. In a conflict of interest situation, non-waiver agreements or reservation-
of-rights notices should contain the following information: 
1. A clear denial of liability under the duty to indemnify; 
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insurer's offer to defend.256 Once the insurer has properly reserved its 
right to contest its duty to indemnify, it can then decide whether it is 
possible and desirable to pursue a declaratory judgment action at the 
same time that it defends the underlying tort action. 
The insurer's alternative of defending under a reservation of rights 
and, if feasible and desirable, pursuing a declaratory judgment is clearly 
the approach favored by the Maryland courts. Under Brohawn and its 
progeny, the insurer has a near absolute duty to defend whenever its in-
sured is sued. This places the burden on the insurer to bring a declara-
tory judgment action to determine that no coverage exists. It also fulfills 
the insured's reasonable expectations and otherwise protects the insured 
from the insurer's mistakes of judgment in evaluating its duty to defend. 
The logical extension of the Brohawn rule is to find that the insurer has 
an absolute duty to defend whenever its insured is sued, unless a court 
declares that no duty to defend exists. 
VII. EMERGING PROBLEMS 
A. Beyond the Text: The Duty to Investigate 
Under the exclusive pleading rule, an insurer determines whether it 
should defend its insured by comparing the allegations in the claimant's 
pleadings to the scope of coverage offered by the policy.257 If the allega-
tions fall actually or potentially within the insurer's duty to indemnify, 
then the insurer must defend even if it possesses knowledge that demon-
strates no duty to indemnify actually exists. 258 On its face, the exclusive 
pleading rule benefits the insured. It can work to the insured's detri-
ment, however, if the alleged facts indicate that the insurer does not have 
a duty to indemnify, but the duty exists under the actual facts of the 
controversy. In such a case, the insurer would not. ordinarily be obli-
gated to defend.259 The inequity of this result has led courts to carve out 
/d. 
2. A clear statement that the insurer is defending the action but believes 
that it may not have a duty to indemnify; 
3. An explanation of the denial of coverage, including a description of 
the specific grounds and provisions of the policy on which the denial is 
based; 
4. A complete disclosure of the existence and nature of the conflict of 
interest; 
5. Detailed notification of the insured's Brohawn options. with specific 
reference to the insured's right to decline the insurer's offer of a defense 
and his right to choose an independent counsel to conduct his defense at 
the insurer's options; 
6. A recommendation that the insured seek the advice of counsel before 
signing the non-waiver agreement or agreeing to the reservation-of-rights 
notice. 
256. /d. at 786-87. 
257. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. 
259. This is a situation where the insurer would have no duty to defend but might have a 
duty to indemnify. 
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an exception to the exclusive pleading rule which requires the insurer to 
defend when the alleged facts show noncoverage but the actual facts indi-
cate coverage. 260 Maryland courts have not had the opportunity to con-
sider the validity of the exception,261 but it would be a logical and natural 
extension of Brohawn and its progeny.262 
The exception to the exclusive pleading rule requires the insurer to 
defend its insured if it knows or should know of facts that indicate a 
possibility of coverage, notwithstanding allegations that indicate noncov-
erage. 263 The exception flows naturally from the Brohawn rule because 
in determining the intent of the parties to an insurance contract, the 
courts consider the reasonable expectations of the insured, 264 and under a 
standard liability policy, an insured reasonably expects that the insurer 
will defend him whenever there is a potentiality of coverage based on a 
claim. 265 The insured surely does not expect that the insurer's duty to 
260. There is a conflict among the jurisdictions as to the applicability of the exclusive 
pleading rule "when the insurer has knowledge of actual facts which are different 
from those alleged in the underlying complaint." American Policyholders' Ins. Co. 
v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d at 247, 250 n.l (Me. 1978). A growing 
number of coutts apply the "factual inclusionary" exception. See Note, Liability 
Insurer's Duty to Defend: American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Stor-
age Co., 30 ME. L. REv. 295, 295-96 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Liability Insurer's 
Duty]. 
261. But see Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Chillum Corp., 71 Md. App. 552, 559, 526 A.2d 642, 
645, cert. denied, 311 Md. 22, 532 A.2d 168 (1987). Although the opinion in Terra 
Nova is not clear, it can be read as an application of the factual test. 
262. Windt observes that the logic behind the exception is "unassailable." A. WINDT, 
supra note 71, § 4.03, at 137. The foundation for the exception can be found in Lee 
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949). There, Judge Hand 
wrote: 
The only exception [to the exclusive pleading rule] we can think of is that 
the injured party might conceivably recover on a claim which, as he had 
alleged it, was outside the policy; but which, as it turned out, the insurer 
was bound to pay. Such is the plasticity of modern pleading that no one 
can be positive that that could not happen. In such a case of course the 
insurer would not have to defend; yet, even then, as soon as, during the 
course of the trial, the changed character of the claim appeared, we need 
not say that the insured might not insist that the insurer take over the 
defence. 
Id. at 752-53 (cited with approval by Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 
396, 408, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975)). 
263. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.03, at 136-37. 
264. For a discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see Kelso, Idaho and 
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboard for an Analysis of a New 
Approach to a Valuable But Often Misunderstood Doctrine, 47 INS. CouNSEL J. 325 
(1980). 
265. In considering the insured's duty to defend in Brohawn, for example, the court of 
appeals stated: 
By clear and unequivocal language, Transamerica has assumed the obliga-
tion of relieving its insured of the expense of defending an action alleging 
and seeking damages within the policy coverage. Additionally, the in-
sured could reasonably expect that the insurer will employ its vast legal 
and investigative resources to defeat the action for the mutual benefit of 
both the insurer and the insured. 
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defend will tum on the manner in which the claimant's attorney drafts a 
complaint. 266 The exception to the exclusive pleading rule furthers the 
insured's reasonable expectations by focusing on actual facts rather than 
on allegations. The insurer, as one court phrased it, "cannot construct a 
formal fortress of the [claimant's] pleadings and retreat behind its 
walls. " 267 
The expectations of the insured are likely to be put at issue in the 
first place because the standard policy is silent on the insurer's duty to 
defend when allegations indicate noncoverage but the actual facts indi-
cate coverage.268 This silence cannot be read to obviate the insurer's 
duty to defend under such circumstances.269 If an insurer intends tore-
lieve itself of the obligation to defend when allegations indicate noncover-
age, it can make its intent "clear and unmistakable" by drafting a 
provision to reflect its intent. 270 The courts have tended to resolve ambi-
guities in the standard provision in favor of the insured,271 thus providing 
Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409, 347 A.2d at 851. 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations, however, is broader than the general 
rule of contra proferentem followed in Maryland because it allows a court to honor 
the insured's reasonable expectations even when these expectations have been lim-
ited by unambiguous language in the policy. The doctrine is closely related to an 
adhesion contract analysis. In light of Maryland's long recognition that unambigu-
ous language will be afforded its ordinary and customary meaning even if it creates a 
hardship for the insured, Brohawn should not be read as an implicit adoption of the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations. Rather, the insured's reasonable expectations 
are but one factor to consider in determining the intent of the parties to an insurance 
policy. 
266. Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 738. 
267. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276, 419 P.2d 168, 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 
112 (1965); see also Rowell v. Hodges, 434 F.2d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[T]o say 
that the [insurer] must gauge its obligation strictly by the pleading called a Com-
plaint, and put blinders on, so to speak, to what it actually knows and has definitely 
ascertained, is somewhat archaic, considering the nature of our present system of 
notice pleading."); Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 
670, 677 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (An insurer should not be allowed to escape its contrac-
tual duty to defend "by ignoring the true facts in reliance upon an ill-founded com-
plaint."). Gray has generated substantial commentary. See, e.g., Note, The 
Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1328 
(1967). 
268. See McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1959); see 
also supra note 1. 
269. Garbett, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
270. In Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962), the 
court stated: 
If the insurer intended otherwise, it could have made its intent clear and 
unmistakable by undertaking to defend 'unless the complaint alleges facts 
which show the claimant to be excluded from coverage,' or by using other 
unambiguous language, for example: 'The company shall defend claims 
and suits, groundless or otherwise, for which it may become liable only 
when the allegations thereof show injury covered by the policy and do not 
show the claim to be excluded by the policy.' 
/d. at 293, 127 S.E.2d at 58. 
271. See A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.02. 
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further justification for the adoption of a factual exception to the exclu-
sive pleading rule. 
The exception's requirement that an insurer defend if it "knows or 
should know" of facts indicating a possibility of coverage necessarily re-
quires the insurer to investigate the facts surrounding a claim.272 From 
an insurer's standpoint, the investigation requirement makes sense. The 
insurer is not merely concerned with saving litigation expenses; its pri-
mary concern is with limiting its exposure under its duty to indemnify.273 
It will best control the cost of indemnification by promptly investigating 
claims to determine whether it could be required to indemnify, and if it 
could, by entering into the litigation and settlement process. 274 Accord-
ingly, imposition of a duty to investigate on the insurer fulfills the in-
sured's reasonable expectation of a defense for a claim within coverage 
and is consistent with Maryland law. 27s 
B. Extrinsic Evidence Used to Rebut a Duty to Defend Raised by the 
Pleadings 
Although extrinsic facts may be admissible under the factual excep-
tion to the exclusive pleading rule, an insurer generally cannot use extrin-
sic facts to determine its duty to defend if the allegations giving rise to 
the defense obligation are materially intertwined in the underlying tort 
action.276 Recently, however, Maryland courts have suggested that ex-
trinsic facts can be used by the insurer to determine its duty to defend 
under certain limited circumstances. If the pleadings on their face give 
rise to a duty to defend based on facts that are not material to the under-
lying tort action, then the insurer may look to the actual facts, not the 
alleged facts, to determine its duty to defend.277 Similarly, an insurer can 
272. See generally Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6; Note, Liability Insurer's 
Duty, supra note 260. 
273. Accord A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.03. 
274. See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 749. 
275. The Maryland Annotated Code provides that: 
(d)The following actions by an insurer ... if committed with such fre-
quency as to indicate a general business practice, are unfair claim settle-
ment practices and are violations of this section .... 
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the 
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; 
(4) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investi-
gation based on all available information. 
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 230A(d)(3)-(4) (1986). 
276. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text. 
277. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 320-21, 475 A.2d 509, 516, 
cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984) (citing Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 
56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970)). For example, suppose that an insured owns two 
cars, a Ford and a Chevy, but only the Ford is covered by his automobile liability 
policy. The insured is in an accident while driving the Chevy. The claimant's 
pleadings allege that the insured was negligent in the operation of "an automobile." 
Under a strict application of the exclusive pleading and potentiality rules, the in-
surer would have a duty to defend because the ambiguous nature of the pleadings 
raises a potentiality of coverage. However, the insurer may look to the actual facts, 
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also use extrinsic evidence to determine its duty to defend when the com-
plaint unequivocally shows coverage based on false allegations of a non-
material fact. 278 
The use of extrinsic evidence to determine a duty to defend often 
arises when a driver of an automobile claims insured status as a permis-
sive user under an omnibus clause of an automobile policy. Allegations 
that the driver was the agent, servant; or employee of the owner of the 
automobile raise the potentiality that the driver was using the automobile 
with the owner's permission, thus bringing the driver within the defini-
tion of an additional insured under the standard automobile policy. If 
the insurer is aware of facts that indicate that the driver was not a per-
missive user, the insurer is caught in a dilemma. The exclusive pleading 
rule demands that the insurer defend the putative insured, but the insurer 
knows that it does not have to defend a person who is a stranger to the 
contract between it and the named insured.279 
Courts and commentators take different approaches to the problem 
of the putative insured.280 One group allows the insurer to consult ex-
trinsic evidence to determine its duty to defend because the standard 
duty-to-defend provision does not obligate the insurer "to defend a com-
not the alleged facts, to determine it~ duty to defend, because the identity of the 
automobile is not material to the underlying tort action. See Rowell v. Hodges, 434 
F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1970); Burd, 56 N.J. at 388, 267 A.2d at 9; see also Kepner v. 
Western Fire Ins. Co., 109 Ariz. 329, 509 P.2d 222 (1973) (insurer could determine 
its duty to defend based on actual facts when the complaint gave rise to a duty to 
defend but the actual facts showed that the insured was excluded from coverage 
under an automobile liability policy because of a business activity exclusion) (cited 
by Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517). See generally A. WINDT, supra 
note 71, § 4.04. 
278. In the example in the note above, the insurer would still be able to consult extrinsic 
evidence to determine its duty to defend even if the complaint had unambiguously 
but falsely alleged that the insured was operating the Ford (the covered automobile) 
at the time of the accident. An insurer would be prudent to assume the defense 
under a reservation of rights but then to institute a declaratory judgment action to · 
determine its duty based on the extrinsic facts. See Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Cook, 619 F.2d 553, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1980). The insurer's failure to offer a defense 
may constitute a breach of its duty. Cf Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 66 
N.Y.2d 6, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 494 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1985) (false allegation that driver 
was a permissive user of the insured owner's automobile gave rise to a duty to de-
fend and subjected the breaching insurer to damages). 
279. One commentator argues that the insurer should be allowed to consult extrinsic 
evidence to determine whether its duty to defend exists. While the pleadings may 
give rise to a duty to defend, the insurer has to defend allegations only if it has an 
actual duty to defend. The relationship of insurer and insured is a prerequisite to 
the insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify. Allowing the drafter of the 
claimant's pleadings to create the insurer-insured relationship would lead to absurd 
results. The driver is not an insured unless and until he can prove, as a matter of 
fact, that he qualifies as an additional insured. See A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.05, 
at 144-47 . 
. 280. See Navajo Freight Lines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Ariz.App. 424,471 P.2d 309 
(1970); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jones, 397 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); 
A. WINDT, supra note 71, at§ 4.05. 
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plete stranger to the contract."281 The other group holds the insurer re-
sponsible for providing a defense to the putative insured but permits the 
insurer to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its defense 
obligation. 282 
In Maryland, although no court has addressed the issue directly, it 
appears that an insurer would be allowed to consult extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether it owed a duty to defend the putative insured, because 
the issue of whether the driver was a permissive user is not material to 
the underlying tort action.283 Nevertheless, a prudent insurer should as-
sume the defense under a reservation of rights and institute a declaratory 
judgment action to determine its defense duty, especially where there is a 
factual dispute over whether the driver had permission to use the insured 
owner's vehicle. 284 Declaratory judgment is appropriate in these cases 
because the issue of permissive use is not material to the issue of either 
the driver's or the owner's tort liability.285 
C. The Duty to Defend and the Tort of Bad Faith 
In Maryland, an insurer is obligated to act fairly and in good faith in 
settling third-party liability claims within the policy limits. 286 This obli-
gation of fair dealing and good faith is a fiduciary duty that arises out of 
the insurer's exclusive control of the investigation, settlement and defense 
of the claim against its insured. 287 The insurer's exclusive control over 
the litigation creates an actual or potential conflict of interest between 
insurer and insured. 288 The insured wants to protect his personal assets 
by settling the case within the policy limits. The prospect of an award in 
excess of the insured's policy limits does not threaten the insurer, how-
281. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.05, at 144. 
282. See Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 494 
N.Y.S.2d 688 (1985); American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarnecki, 255 La. 251, 
230 So. 2d 253 (1970); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Rollings, 355 So. 2d 1041 
(La. Ct. App. 1978). 
283. Cf Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970) (cited with ap-
proval in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509, 
516, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984)). 
284. In the likely event that the claimant sues both the driver and the insured owner, the 
insurer would have an obligation to defend both. The insurer would also have to 
offer the driver his Brohawn choice of counsel. It would be best, however, if the 
insurer engaged separate counsel to represent the driver and the owner. The 
owner's attorney would move quickly to rebut the presumption of agency and, if 
possible, would seek summary judgment. At the same time, the insurer could insti-
tute a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the driver was using the 
automobile with the owner's permission. 
285. McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). But see Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill.2d 
444,430 N.E.2d 1079 (1981) (issue of permissive use so intertwined with concept of 
agency that declaratory judgment was not appropriate). 
286. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967); 
Sweeten v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963). 
287. Sweeten, 233 Md. at 55, 194 A.2d at 818. 
288. /d. This conflict of interest, however, does not give rise to a Brohawn choice of 
independent counsel because the conflict does not involve the conduct of the case. 
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ever, so the insurer is less motivated to settle the claim within policy 
limits.289 
The duty to act fairly and in good faith requires the insurer to give 
equal weight to its own interests and those of the insured. 290 The insurer 
must act honestly, exercise reasonable care, diligently investigate and ap-
praise the case, and keep its insured reasonably well-informed of the pro-
gress of the case, including settlement offers.291 Although the good faith 
standard requires the insurer to act honestly and diligently, it does not 
impose liaqility upon the insurer for simple negligence. 292 Serious and 
recurrent negligence, however, may be evidence of bad faith. 293 Many 
factors may affect whether an insurer's decision not to settle was an hon-
est and informed one that took the insured's interests into account.294 If 
an insurer acts in bad faith by not settling a third-party claim within 
policy limits, then it is liable for any verdict in excess of the policy 
limits.295 
Maryland courts have limited the scope of the tort of bad faith to 
the insurer's duty to settle and have expressly refused to expand the tort 
to situations involving an insurer's bad faith failure to pay an insurance 
claim.296 The Maryland courts, however, have not decided whether the 
289. Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 247, 536 A.2d 1211, 1213, 
cert. denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 (1988). 
290. Sobus v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 393 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1975) (applying 
Maryland law). The concept of "good faith" is a "highly elusive one." /d. at 672. 
291. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 332, 236 A.2d 269, 273 
(1967). 
292. Sobus, 393 F. Supp. at 673. An insurer also has a separate tort duty to "conduct the 
actual defense of the insured with reasonable care .... " /d. at 671. Among other 
things, this duty requires the insurer to conduct an adequate investigation. If the 
insurer breaches its duty of reasonable care in preparing and conducting the defense, 
then it "is liable for a verdict adverse to its insured in excess of the policy limits, 
which is caused by the insurer's negligence." /d. See generally 1A R. LONG & M. 
RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.26; A. W~NDT, supra note 71, § 4.38. 
293. Sobus, 393 F. Supp. at 673. 
294. Among the factors that a court will consider in determining whether an insurer 
breached its obligation to use good faith in settling a claim within its insured's pol-
icy limits are: 
[T]he severity of the plaintiff's injuries giving rise to the likelihood of a 
verdict greatly in excess of the policy limits; lack of proper and adequate 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident; ... failure of 
the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer within or near the 
policy limits; pressure by the insurer on the insured to make a contribution 
towards a compromise settlement within the policy limits, as an induce-
ment to settlement by the insurer; and actions which demonstrate a 
greater concern for the insurer's monetary interests than the financial risk 
attendant to the insured's predicament. 
White, 248 Md. at 332, 236 A.2d at 273. A " 'mere mistake of judgment' " will not 
impose liability on the insurer. Sobus, 393 F. Supp. at 673 (quoting American Casu-
alty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 1951)). The issue of whether the 
insurer acted in good faith is a factual one. Schlossberg v. Epstein, 73 Md. App. 
415, 436, 534 A.2d 1003, 1014 (1988). 
295. See, e.g., White, 248 Md. at 330-31, 236 A.2d at 272. 
296. Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 246, 536 A.2d 1211, 1212, 
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tort should be extended to the duty to defend.297 While there are argu-
ments to the contrary,298 the extension seems both logical and inevitable, 
especially in light of the related obligations of reasonable care and good 
faith imposed on the insurer. 299 
Several jurisdictions have recognized that a bad faith refusal to de-
fend may constitute a breach of the insurer's duty of fair dealing and 
good faith. 300 In such jurisdictions, the mere refusal to defend does not 
in itself constitute bad faith. While the insured need not show that the 
insurer acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, he must show more than 
the mere breach of the contractual duty to defend.301 An insurer's fail-
ure to conduct an investigation into its duty to defend, coupled with its 
failure to consider the opinions of its own staff regarding its duty to de-
fend, has been held to constitute sufficient proof of bad faith. 302 But if 
the insurer has reasonable grounds for refusing to defend its insured, 
then no tort liability will attach. 303 
The extension of the tort of bad faith to the duty to defend opens the 
door to the recovery of damages beyond those available in traditional 
breach of contract suits. In a breach of contract action based on an in-
surer's refusal to defend, the insured is entitled to reasonable attorney's 
fees and expenses incurred in the underlying tort suit and in any declara-
tory judgment action brought against the insurer to determine cover-
cert. denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 (1988); Caruso v. Republic Ins. Co., 558 F. 
Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1983) (applying Maryland law). 
297. In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509, 514-
15, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984), however, the trial court as-
sumed that the tort of bad faith did exist and even awarded the insured punitive 
damages. On appeal, the court did not address the validity of a bad faith claim 
based on an insurer's refusal to defend its insured. But see Dickson v. Selected 
Risks Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 80, 81 (D. Md. 1987) (applying Maryland law) (excess 
insurer's refusal to defend does npt give rise to a claim based on "bad faith;" rather 
the insurer's breach is "fully remedial by a conract action."). 
298. The duty to act in good faith is inherent in every contract. Caruso, 558 F. Supp. 
430; Johnson, 74 Md. App. 243, 536 A.2d 1211. The tort of bad faith arises from 
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the insured by the insurer because the insurer's 
total control of the case creates a potential conflict of interest. See supra text ac-
companying notes 287-289. But there is no need to impose a separate tort duty on 
the insurer to act in good faith in honoring its duty to defend, because there is no 
potential for a conflict of interest to arise. In other words, there is no fiduciary duty 
owed because the fiduciary duty is not undertaken. See Farris v. United States Fi-
delity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d lOIS (1978). 
299. Indeed, one commentator has even stated that "there appears no valid reason why a 
liability insurer that refuses in bad faith to defend its insured against a third-party 
action should not also be subject to tort liability for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing." M. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE, & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE 
BAD FAITH LITIGATION§ 3.25[1) (1987) [hereinafter M. SHERNOFF). 
300. /d. 
301. /d. ("To recover on a tort theory for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, it 
appears that the insured must establish more than a breach of the contractual duty 
to defend."). 
302. See Tibbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985). 
303. See American Excess Ins. Co. v. M.G.M. Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 P.2d 1352, 1354-
SS (Nev. 1986); Calenda \/. Allstate Ins. Co., 518 A.2d 624, 629 (R.I. 1986). 
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age. 304 In those jurisdictions that recognize the tort of bad faith in the 
duty to defend context, an insured is entitled to recover damages for 
emotional distress, and under certain circumstances, punitive damages, 
in addition to the amount of any judgment in excess of his policy lim-
its. 305 If Maryland courts were to extend the tort of bad faith to the duty 
to defend, it is likely that both damages for emotional distress306 and, 
upon a showing of actual malice, punitive damages307 could be 
recovered. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In Maryland, the standard liability policy requires the insurer to de-
fend the insured against any suit alleging a claim that falls within the 
scope of the policy's coverage. In addition, the insurer is required to 
defend the insured against any suit alleging a claim that does not fall 
clearly within the scope of the policy's coverage if there is a potential that 
the claim may be covered. The insurer's obligation to defend claims that 
raise a potential duty to indemnify gives the insured the litigation protec-
tion he purchased and is one of the most important benefits in the stan-
dard liability policy. 
In recent years, Maryland courts have broadened the insurer's obli-
gations to a point where the insurer has a near-absolute duty to defend 
whenever its insured is sued. An insurer is obligated to defend its insured 
unless it can be concluded as a matter of law that no factual or legal basis 
exists on which the insurer may be held liable under its duty to 
indemnify. 
The imposition of a near-absolute duty to defend has several conse-
quences: it places the burden on the insurer to bring a declaratory judg-
ment action to determine its obligation if the insurer disputes such an 
obligation, it fulfills the insured's reasonable expectations and it protects 
the insured from the insurer's mistakes of judgment in evaluating its duty 
to defend. The basic rule has been expanded in some jurisdictions by 
applying the tort of bad faith to the insurer's duty to defend and by im-
posing a defense duty under the factual exception to the exclusive plead-
ing rule. Although these extensions of the duty have not yet been 
304. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
305. See generally A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.34, at 210-11; M. SHERNOFF, supra note 
299, § 3.26[2]; Annotation, Insurer's Tort Liability for Consequential or Punitive 
Damages for Wrongful Failure or Refusal to Defend Insured, 20 A.L.R.4TH 23 
(1984). 
306. For a general consideration of damages for emotional distress, see Annotation, 
Emotional or Mental Distress as Element of Damages for Liability Insurer's Wrong-
ful Refusal to Settle, 57 A.L.R.4TH 801 (1988). 
307. See H. & R. Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1974) (punitive 
damages awarded in torts arising out of a breach of contract upon a showing of 
actual malice); cf Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 311-12, 
475 A.2d 509, 512, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984) (trial court 
granted punitive damages for a bad faith refusal to defend, but the appellate court 
did not address either the availability or the standard for awarding such damages). 
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adopted in Maryland, they further the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured and comport with Maryland public policy. The burden of the in-
surer's duty to defend is heavy, but it is a burden the insurer, as the 
drafter of the policy, has chosen to bear. 
